Historical Lithuania

A sad 70th anniversary

- Posted by - 10908(7) CommentA+sad+70th+anniversary2011-12-22+14%3A27%3A040df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D10908

In June 1941, the first massive arrest and deportation of the Lithuanian population was perpetrated. A cargo of 17.500 people were crammed into cattle cars. Moscow’s instruction often required separation of men from their families: some 4.000 men were separated and transported to concentration camps in the Krasnoyarsk territory while 13.500 women, children and elderly people were transported mostly to Kazakhstan, the Altai Mountains territory, Russia’s republic of Komi, the Tomsk region, and the Arctic zone.

As far back as in the first days of the Soviet occupation the searches for "people's enemies" commenced: only in July 12-16, 1940 more than 500 people were arrested - most of them were public men and politicians, army officers, office employees of the independent Lithuania. In the short run, among the dangerous enemies of the Soviet system were reckoned ordinary members of legal parties, organizations that existed in independent Lithuania, police officers, teachers and even Esperantists and philatelists. The repressive departments established pursuing the example of the Soviet Union took into their disposition Lithuanian archives and looked for the "anti-Soviet elements".

At the beginning of the Soviet period, Lithuanian people most of all suffered from deportations - forced mass removal from the domicile to the remote regions of the Soviet Union. The first mass deportation began on June 14, 1941, at night. People realizing nothing were woken up, sat into lorries and conveyed to the nearest railroad station. Thousands of people woken up from sleep (women, children and old people) were told to leave their homes in a hurry. Frightened, not realizing where and why they were taken, most of them failed to take with them even that formally permitted standard of 100 kg of necessities of life. Crammed into the goods wagons, choking from stuffiness without water and hot meal people were kept for several days in obscurity. Only completely formed trains moved to the East - women, old people and children were sent to deportation, the heads of the families - to prisons and camps. Over few days of June, more than 18 thousand people were taken out from Lithuania. This number would have been even larger but the war between Germany and the USSR started on June 22

People deported in 1941 experienced especially difficult fate. Though the war suspended the further deportation, the conditions of the deported became even harder. Upon arrival at the country impoverished by the nationalization and collectivization, allotting the last stock to the front, the deported interested Soviet authorities only as the charge free labour force. Most of the deported were accommodated in joint barracks and dug-outs. People got ill from the epidemics caused by the starvation and anti-sanitary conditions, many of them died, children first of all. In June, 1942, as soon as they began to accustom to their fate, almost half of Lithuanians were taken from Altai territory for real perish to the north of Yakut.
There Lithuanians were distributed to the isle of Tit Ari (at the mouth of the river Lena), Bykov peninsula (at the Laptev Sea), mouth of the river Jana, other places. Debarked from the barges and left in severe polar conditions without lodging, food, warm clothes they died from starvation and diseases. Less than a half of people deported in 1941 returned to Lithuania after 15 or more years. The condition of prisoners and men separated from their families was even more difficult. When the war ended, many of the camps were liquidated, and the prisoners were for hundreds of kilometers driven on foot to other camps. Hundreds of prisoners died on the way and did not reach new places of imprisonment. NKVD camps were enormous cemeteries, in which almost 8 thousand Lithuanians were buried during 1941-1944.
When the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania for the second time in the autumn of 1944, the number of people reckoned among the "anti-Soviet elements" even increased. Not only members of resistance, but also members of their families, partisans' supporters, etc. were reckoned among them. Arrests and deportations of Lithuanian people were renewed.

People were taken to deportation by goods (cattle) wagons with as many people and things stuffed as it were possible. There were no even most necessary sanitary and hygiene conditions in the wagons, while the journey took several weeks or even a month. Sometimes people did not receive food for several days. Babies and elderly people died failing to undergo long and hard journey via the wide expanses of the USSR.

Description: http://www.travel-lithuania.com/images_museum/113_dep2.jpg
At the train wagon on the road to Siberia. 1951

Special agents appointed from Moscow arranged Mass deportations. The lists of the families and individual persons subject to deportation - the main one and reserve (in case the fulfillment of the plan failed) were formed by the district's sections of repressive departments. The inclusion file was made for every deported family or person. The property of the deported family was seized and distributed. The deportations were prepared in advance and with great secrecy in order people would not skulk.

The local authorities were notified about the prospect deportation only on the eve.
The greatest deportations were masked by very innocent, poetic names - codes used in the correspondence of Soviet departments, radio and telephone conversations. For example, the deportation of May 1948 was named "Vesna" ("Spring"), March 1949 - "Priboj" ("Surf"), October 1951 - "Osen" ("Autumn"). By the amount of the deported people the largest were deportations of May 1948, March, 1949 and October 1951. All of them were fulfilled following the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR detailed by the puppet Council of Ministers of LSSR and the local MGB.

On May 22-27, 1948 more than 40 thousand people were deported from Lithuania (11 thousand children were among them). On March 25-28, 1949, almost 30 thousand people with more than 8 thousand children among them were deported. During the operation, third by the number of deported people, on October 2-3, 1951, almost 17 thousand people and more than 5 thousand children among them were taken away from Lithuania.

Description: http://www.travel-lithuania.com/images_museum/113_dep3.jpg People were deported for various periods of time: for 20 years (in June 1941), for 10 years (1947 - April 1948), for unlimited period of time (in 1949 - 1953). Large penalties menaced for escaping from deportation.
The total number of Lithuanian people deported in 1940-1941, 1945-1952 exceeded 132 thousand. The major part of them was brought to Krasnoyarsk territory, Irkutsk and Tomsk regions

28 thousand from 132 thousand deported people perished from starvation, diseases and unbearable work. About 50 thousand of them could not return to Lithuania for a long time. The last Lithuanians were released from deportation only upon announcement of the order of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of the USSR, dated January 7, 1960.

Description: http://www.travel-lithuania.com/images_museum/113_dep4.jpg
Workers of Vorkuta mines. 1956

The conditions of Lithuanian people kept in prisons or camps were even more difficult. In 1950, 12 prisons, 8 subunits of concentration camps and 23 inner prisons functioned in Lithuania. It made only small part of the GULAG system. Annually thousands and tens of thousands of prisoners from Lithuania were sent to the prisons and camps scattered in the vast territory of the USSR. The prisoners were transported by stages - from one prison to another or directly to the specified camp. In 1944-1952, more than 142 thousand of Lithuanian people got into the camps of GULAG.

As a rule, healthy people several years after getting into the camps became ailing. The death caused by the tortures while interrogating, difficult conditions of imprisonment, continuous starving, hard work was not an exception. In Far Siberia, Kazakhstan, other localities of the USSR, a great deal of graves of Lithuanians were left. By the data of KGB, about 17 thousand people returned to Lithuania from deportation and camps in 1955-1956.

Lithuanian deportees and prisoners were made a cheap labour force deprived of all rights. People deported to Tomsk region or those who were in Tomsk's camps stung by gnats and blood sucking flies, in winter walking through the deepest snowdrifts, worked in taiga, prepared and floated rafts, gathered resin. In 1942, people deported to the frosty Frigid Zone fished and the rest of them left in the first place of deportation worked in sovkhozs of Altai territory. People exhausted by heat and thirst built roads in Kazakhstan deserts, worked at the cotton plantations of Tajikistan. Many Lithuanian deportees and prisoners worked in Ural Bauxite mines, Kuzbas and Vorkuta coal pits, Bodaib gold mines (Irkutsk region), gigantic sawmills of Igarka. The deportees were paid a little for their work, meanwhile the prisoners worked just for daily food ration which was cut for those who did not succeed to fulfill their quotas.

Source: http://www.travel-lithuania.com

Category : Historical Lithuania

- Posted by - 10494(2) Comment2011-11-01+21%3A05%3A220df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D10494

Advent 1945:

IN THE WORLD
The story of the greatest celebration in the history of our today’s world.

This book, “Christmas 1945: The Story of the Greatest Celebration in American History”, by the author Matthew Litt, was advertised as follows:

“Across America, people crowd churches praying with gratitude for the peace in place, and reach out to wounded veterans, children who lost fathers, and neighbors who lost sons. Americans in big cities and small, participate in displays of the intrinsic love so indicative of the American spirit.”

IN LITHUANIA
The story of one bloody war ending and another one just about to start.

Dead bodies of unknown Lithuanian partisans, terribly mutilated, as they would have appeared in the courtyard of the Panevežys KGB headquarter and other places in Lithuania during Advent and Christmas of 1945.

In 1944-45 Lithuanians were forced to realize that the bloody World War II had been replaced by a new war, the longest and bloodiest guerrilla war in modern European history, lasting from 1944 to at least 1953.

Advent and Christmas of 1945 was over most of the world celebrated with a joy and delight almost never before seen. Young and old gathered in homes, on streets and in churches. An endless series of victory ceremonies took place in almost every corner of the world. With a deep sense of joy and gratitude all wanted each other warm, comfortable and relaxing Christmas holidays, knowing that the Nazi era was over and that the world now more than ever could look forward to a future of peace and prosperity. The war had finally released the grip, forgotten was the economic recession of the 1930s. Forgotten was also our Western World’s close friends and neighbours - the Baltic States.

On a small farm in northern Lithuania, in the outskirts of the village Šilagalis, Christmas 1945 is nearing. It is the 22nd of December, and the mother of the house feels very happy that her 21 year old son Povilas has finally come home to visit after having been away for many months.

He has come to change into dry clothes to keep him warm through the cold winter days waiting. His mother is infinitely happy to have her son home this one day, and she does everything she can to treat him with all the good food and drink their little farm can produce. You never know how long it will be till next time.

Povilas had joined a local partisan group earlier in 1945, and now spends all time in the North Lithuanian forests where the local "forest brothers" have established their hideouts. It is from these caches, usually at night, that they conduct their operations against military installations and forces of the Soviet Red Army and NKVD (the secret Soviet police that later changed name to KGB).

The Soviet occupation of Lithuania has lasted for more than a year now, but Povilas and other forest brothers still hope that their constant needle sticks can get Josef Stalin to pull his troops out of Lithuania and the other two Baltic countries.

Povilas is pleased to finally have got a day off, not least is he happy to eat real Christmas food and enjoy some Christmas cheer with the family. A small fly in the ointment is the fact that his father, little sister and little brother are not home.

Both the brother and the sister go to a boarding school in the nearest town, Panevežys, and his father had early in the morning that same day left for the town to bring them home for Christmas. But his mother is here, and when she and he, with arms around each other, go out in the barn to feed the animals, he sings with joy a song he so often has sung in the partisan camp in recent months:

"Dying young is difficult, but not for my country. For my country, Lithuania, I am ready to sacrifice my young life. "

His mother scolds him motherly strictly that he sings: "You know it is not proper to sing now that it's Advent," she says. Lithuania's Roman Catholic Church is strict when it comes to how to behave through the various festive times of the year, and his mother admonishes her son, therefore, while at the same time feeling proud and happy that he makes such an honourable service to the home country.

Back in the farmhouse they suddenly hear that the dog starts to bark. Through the window they see a group of soldiers approaching. The soldiers are still on some distance, so Povilas has time to hide in a small cellar room they have made beneath the living room floor, and the mother has time to cover the cellar hatch as best she can.

The cellar room has also previously been used to hide partisans, and both think this is a safe hiding place until the soldiers have left again.

The mother walks out into the yard to meet the soldiers from the Soviet Red Army. They ask if her son is home, and if he, in case, is alone. Without waiting for an answer, they storm into the house and begin to turn upside down on furniture and fixtures. Then they start shooting down to the floor to see if it can be cavities under the floorboards. It takes some time before they discover the cellar hatch, but as soon as they find and open it, they fire a machinegun volley into the hole. It does not take long before they pull the now perforated and lifeless body of Povilas out of the basement. The whole operation has taken them five hours, but they have found what they sought. One more young Lithuanian life has been lost in the desperate struggle against the overwhelming odds.

The distance from the farm to the road is over 500 meters, so the soldiers find a chain in the barn so they can tow the corpse of Povilas across the fields over to the military vehicle waiting. The mother is forced to follow, and soon they are on their way to the NKVD headquarters in Panevezys, where the body of Povilas is thrown out in the middle of the courtyard. His mother is brought to a prison cell in the basement.

Early next morning, Christmas Eve 1945, the mother is brutally dragged up from the wooden bench she has laid sleepless on during the night. Today, and every subsequent day for two weeks, she is brought up to ever-new interrogations, walking across the courtyard where the mutilated body of her son still is lying.

Christmas and New Year holiday season in 1945 passes with this terrible routine for a mother in tears and sorrow. Early in January, she is released and can finally go home and tell the family what has happened.

In thousands of homes around the world happy families walk around their Christmas trees. They celebrate that Jesus is born and the world's evil is overcome. 1946 is the beginning of the new and bright times for the human kind…

In northern Lithuania the parents of Povilas and other parents finally find out where the bodies of their killed young partisan sons have been dumped. Under the cover of dark nights in early January 1946, they manage to bring the bodies of their children home to secret burials in their hometown cemeteries.

Christmas 1945 is over. Most of the world looks forward to many good years of peace, freedom and economic growth. The Baltic States' ten-year guerrilla war against the occupiers has just begun.

* * *

The story of Povilas is real. It is based on a passage from the book "Lithuania's struggle for freedom" (Lithuanian Partisans' War Chronicles).

Povilas Peleckas was born on 24 January 1924 into a farming family in the village of Šilagalis in the Panevežys district north in Lithuania. He attended Šilagalis primary school. Later he helped his parents on the farm. In 1944 when the USSR invaded and occupied Lithuania for the second time (first time was in 1940), Povilas was due for conscription into the Red Army. He refused to go. When a local partisan unit was formed, led by Major Januškevičius, Povilas joined the fighters. In September 1945 many of the members of the unit were killed in battle, and another three were killed at the beginning of December. Those who remained alive determined to join a larger partisan unit. But fate was against them.

See also: https://vilnews.com/?p=1739

Dates regarding the fall of Soviet communism

- Posted by - 10045(1) Comment2011-11-01+14%3A28%3A590df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D10045

11-13 January 1990 -- one-half of Vilnius’ 600,000 population
demonstrate for pro-independence, to ‘welcome’ visiting
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Here with the local
communist party leader Algirdas Brazauskas.

By KR Slade

1980’s -- economic problems in the USSR; rise of ‘Solidarity’ in Poland
1985 -- Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announces new Soviet policies of ‘glastnost’ (i.e., ‘political openness’) and ‘perestroika’ (i.e., ‘political and economic restructuring’)
3 June 1988 -- in Vilnius, the Lithuanian ‘Sajudis’ (i.e., ‘restructuring’) movement is founded; mostly artists; 17 of the 35 initial members were members of the Communist Party
22 October 1988 -- first Sajudis General Congress meets: first organised opposition to the Communist Party
March-May 1989 -- Sajudis wins legislative seats in the USSR’s highest body of Soviet administration, the Congress of People's Deputies
February 1989 -- Sąjudis declares Lithuanian ‘independence’, and that Lithuania had been forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union
May 1989 -- Sajudis proclaims Lithuanian ‘sovereignty’; and declares that Lithuania's incorporation into the Soviet Union was illegal
23 August 1989 -- the “Baltic Way”: mass protest of two million people, linking hands in a ‘human chain’, of 650 kilometres: from Vilnius (Lithuania) to Riga (Latvia) to Tallinn (Estonia)
9 November 1989 -- ‘fall’ of the Berlin Wall
December 1989 -- the Communist Party of Lithuania secedes from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the 20th Communist Congress
11-13 January 1990 -- one-half of Vilnius’ 600,000 population demonstrate for pro-independence, to ‘welcome’ visiting Soviet President Gorbechev

In January 1990, just a few days after the dramatic events
at the 20th Communist Congress, Mikhail Gorbachev came to
Vilnius for a final attempt to convince Brazauskas
to change his mind, but in vain.

7 February 1990 -- the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union agrees to give up its monopoly of power; during the next several weeks, the 15 constituent republics of the USSR hold their first competitive elections
24 February 1990 -- Sajudis wins 106 of 141 seats in the Lithuanian parliament; the Communist Party of Lithuania wins 23 seats
4 March 1990 -- pro-independence Sajudis candidates win an overall majority in the first free elections held in Lithuania since 1940
11 March 1990 -- the ‘Supreme Soviet’ (i.e., soon to become the ‘Supreme Council’, which later becomes the parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania unanimously declares the ‘restoration’ of Lithuania’s independence
30 March 1990 -- the Estonian Supreme Council declares Soviet power in the Estonian SSR since 1940 to have been illegal, and begins a process to re-establish Estonia as an independent state
17 April 1990 -- Moscow imposes economic blockade on Lithuania
4 May 1990 -- the Latvian Supreme Council begins the process of restoration of independence of the Latvian SSR, by voting to stipulate a transitional period to complete independence
13 January 1991 -- Soviet tanks and troops attempt to storm the parliament and the only television-station broadcasting tower; 14 dead and hundreds injured: all unarmed civilians
12 February 1991 -- Iceland is the first country to recognize the new (i.e., re-established) Republic of Lithuania
31 July 1991 -- Soviet special agents kill 7 Lithuanian border guards and policemen (at the Lithuania-Belarus border station)
21 August 1991 -- failure of the Moscow putsch/coup (since January) to remove Gorbechev
21 August 1991 -- Lenin’s statue is removed from the Vilnius square that faces the KGB building
29 August 1991 -- Sweden is first western country to open an embassy in Vilnius
2 September 1991 -- the United Nations and the USA recognize Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia
6 September 1991 -- the USSR recognizes Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia
17 September 1991 -- Lithuania joins the United Nations
8 December 1991 -- the leaders of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian republics signed the Belavezha Accords, declaring the Soviet Union dissolved and replacing it with the CIS (i.e., ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’)
12 December 1991 -- the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian SFSR formally ratifies the Belavezha Accords, approving Russia's secession from the USSR, and denounces the 1922 Treaty on the creation of the Soviet Union
25 December 1991 -- President Gorbachev resigns as president of the USSR, declaring the office extinct, and ceding all the powers still vested in it to the president of Russia (i.e., Yeltsin); that night, the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time over the Kremlin
26 December 1991 -- the Council of Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR recognized the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and dissolved itself
31 December 1991 -- all official Soviet institutions cease operations
31 August 1993 -- the last Russian soldier leaves Lithuania
March 2004 -- Lithuania joins NATO
May 2004 -- Lithuania becomes a member of the European Union

Category : Historical Lithuania

- Posted by - 8867(5) Comment2011-09-16+13%3A07%3A480df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D8867

Remembering
Darius and Girenas

The American-Lithuanian pilots, Steponas Darius (1896-1933) and Stasys Girenas (1893-1933) attempted in the year 1933 to beat Charles Lindberg’s non-stop distance record across the Atlantic by flying from New York City to Kaunas, then the temporary capital of Lithuania.

Their plane, Lituanica, was an Bellanca CH-300 Pacemaker airplane. After successfully flying 6,411 km, it crashed, 650 km from its destination, Kaunas. Both pilots were killed.

Movie clip from the crash scene.

Steponas Darius was born at Rubiske, Lithuania in 1896 as Steponas Darasius. His father died while he was young; his mother remarried and the family moved to America in 1907. The family eventually settled in Bridgeport, a Lithuanian neighborhood in Chicago. While growing up, Steponas became quite the sportsman and played a variety of sports, including rugby, football, basketball, baseball, and boxing. In addition, he worked as an errand boy at an aviation store owned by famous aviation pioneer Wright brothers.
During World War I he shortened his surname to Darius, and joined the U.S. Army in 1917. He served valiantly in France and was awarded the “Purple Heart” and the “Great War for Civilization” medals. After returning to Chicago briefly after the War, Darius returned to his homeland Lithuania in 1920, which was fighting for its independence. He joined the Kaunas Military School and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant upon his graduation in 1921. He joined the training squadron of the Lithuaian Air Force in 1922, and participated in the 1923 liberation of Lithuania’s port city of Klaipeda. He served in the Lithuanian Air Force for 5 years, and was promoted to the ranks of flying officer, and flight lieutenant.

Having received a year’s leave from the Lithuanian army Darius left Lithuania in 1927 and returned to the United States to visit his friends and relatives there. On his journey home he witnessed the triumphant celebration for aviator Charles Lindbergh at Le Bourget Airport in Paris. Darius was inspired and determined that he would someday fly a plane from New York to Kaunas.

Upon his return to the United States, Darius earned various pilot’s licenses, including international and transport pilot. He began racing airplanes and also established an aviation company with an American pilot in Indiana. After some mechanical misfortunes, Darius left the firm in 1929 and returned to the Chicago area. He then began working for a Bellanca dealer at Palwaukee Airport north of Chicago. While there he became a pilot and instructor of Commercial aviation, and a master at flying all types of aircraft of his day.

The pilots and their aircraft, Lituanica.

Steponas Darius teamed up with aviator Stasys Girenas in 1932, and the pair formed a flying partnership dedicated to a well-publicized trans-Atlantic flight. Girenas also had a similar background as his partner, having been born in Lithuania, educated in Chicago, and serving in the U.S. Army in World War I. The duo purchased a used Bellanca Pacemaker plane from the Chicago Daily News in 1932, dubbed it the “Lituanica” and modified it for their flight. Money was raised from numerous Lithuanian clubs and organizations to finance their operation.

The duo left Floyd Bennett Airport in New York City headed for Kaunas on July 15, 1933, and crashed over Soldin, Germany (115 km. north of Berlin) on July 17 after 35 hours in flight. It was strongly suspected that they were shot down by the Nazi’s after they strayed well into German airspace. A thorough investigation however, pointed to stormy, rainy weather and fog as the most likely deadly factor in their flight. Autopsies revealed no signs of any bullets on their bodies whatsoever. The bodies of the pilots and their plane were taken to Kaunas, and over 60,000 persons attended the funeral there. The duo have since been memorialized on numerous Lithuanian stamps, coins, medals, and decorations. Numerous monuments have been erected in their memory both in the United States and in Lithuania.

When Lithuania regained its independence in 1990, plans were made for the reestablishment of the national monetary system, the litas. A design competition was held for the various denominations. The 10 litù banknote was designed in 1991 by 28-year-old artist Giedrius Jonaitis (born 1963), a graduate of the Vilnius Art Academy, and a member of the Lithuanian Artists Association. The note’s design features the theme of Darius and Girìnas. The images of the flyers were based upon official 1933 press photographs of the duo. The back of the note features their plane flying over the waves of the Atlantic, with an outline of North America and Europe in the background. No boundaries of countries were drawn on the map portion, to avoid any controversies that existed as the result of the occupation of the capital city of Vilnius by Poland from 1920 to 1939, and subsequent Soviet-imposed boundaries following World War II.

10 litu note showing face side

In 1934 Steponas Darius and Stasys Girėnas bodies were embalmed by professor Jurgis Zilinskas. In 1936 the Lithuanian government decided to build a mausoleum for them in Kaunas' old cemetery, that was destroyed after Soviet re-occupation. From then until the present day, the wreckage of Lituanica has been on display in the Vytautas the Great War Museum in Kaunas. At present the pilots' bodies rest in the Military Cemetery of Šančiai, Kaunas.

Pašto ženklas, 75th anniversary of
S. Darius and S. Girenas flight.

Chicago's Lithuanian community erected an Art Deco Monument commemorating the pilots in Chicago's Marquette Park in 1935 where it still stands to this day.

Feliksas Vaitkus flight was inspired by the flight and commemorated it with a flight of Lituanica II in 1935.

The flight is commemorated in a movie Skrydis per Atlantą (Flight over Atlantics - 1983). Kaunas's sports stadium, S.Darius and S.Girėnas Stadium where the Lithuanian national soccer team plays its home matches is also named in their honor. There is a tall stone monument near the stadium, the Lithuanian Academy of Sport and the Ąžuolynas Park dedicated to the pilots.

Sculptor Bronius Pundzius has made a relief of the pilots' faces on the Puntukas, then the largest known boulder in the territory of Lithuania in 1943.

Relief at the Puntukas boulder, 1943.

Category : Featured black / Historical Lithuania

- Posted by - 8276(1) Comment2011-08-09+14%3A23%3A460df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D8276

Dénes Fejér

Ruszkik, haza!
Russians, go home!

The 1956 revolution in Hungary gave hope - but ended in disillusionment. This was what Dénes Fejér (78) told me when I met him here in the University Aula in his South-Hungarian hometown Szeged. Mr. Fejér was himself a 23-year old journalist, actively participating when the Hungarian uproar against the Soviet rulers started exactly here 55 years ago.

I asked him to confirm that the 1956 revolution in Hungary started here in the University Aula in the Szeged University,

“Yes, this is correct,” he says. “55 years ago, on the 16th of October, 1956, students from our Szeged town founded the youth organisation MEFESZ (Hungarian Student Organisation). This event could be considered as the very first step of the revolution because in Hungary, at that time, after ten years of Communist post war regime, only state founded and supported organisations could be established in a legal way.”

Text: Aage Myhre
aage.myhre@VilNews.com

“The Szeged initiative could be seen as the first crack on a dam where water is about to pour through. Of course, you don’t immediately realise when you see a small stream of water; that what follows it is going to overwhelm you. The Communist leadership did not see right away what actually was about to happen, as they did not expect such a massive force appearing in just a few days.”

Dénes Fejér, who was 23 when the revolt started, stands here in the Aula that looks more or less the same as it did in 1956, demonstrating how things started evolving exactly here that October evening 55 years ago.

Hungarians gather around the head of the toppled Stalin Monument in Budapest 1956.

I ask Dénes Fejér to explain more about the 1956 revolt that started here in Szeged:
You were yourself present in that Aula meeting, and if I understand you correctly, this meeting became a fateful event (among several other developments in those days) which led inevitably to the outbreak of the revolution. It was the first meeting after World War II where questions were not pre-arranged slogans glorifying the regime, but where - because of the insistence of the audience - everyone was allowed to speak, and raise questions. What would you say were the most significant things happened at that assembly?

For two years after the end of the war in 1945, there was a plural political system in Hungary. Different political parties existed, and in the 1945 general elections the Independent Smallholder and Civil Party received absolute majority with 54% of the votes and the Communist Party only received 17%. Stalin realised that the people of Hungary did not want to embrace its system. The 1947 elections were already fraudulent and the Communist forces won. In 1948 the Social democratic Party was forcibly incorporated into the Communist party. The general wave of terror appeared only after this time. Forced nationalisation was started with businesses, commercial institutions, industrial entities and later, even private property like houses. A terror organisation was created within the Internal Ministry, called the AVO (State Security Authority) which later became an independent entity, having its own rules and methods.

This was the background where the MEFESZ was established, as the very first independent organisation in Communist Hungary. The programme and its demands were summarised in twenty points of the there are a few that are interesting. These included the request for open and free debates, the open trial of guilty Communist functionaries, the abolishment of death penalty in political cases, democratic elections, freedom of speech, and the that the 15th of March, the Commemoration Day of the 1848 Revolution should become an official national day. As you can see, these conditions and demands are natural in a free country but were unknown and unthinkable in a dictatorship. Although not part of the twenty points, another demand was phrased by the participant of the meeting. This was later a key phrase of the revolution: Russians, go home! The most fundamental demand was for the truth, that is to say that the leaders of the country should not lie and should not make the young people and the population lie. Telling the truth in Hungary at that time meant sever prison sentences.

To my knowledge, the assembly started as a rather innocent gathering where the students simply asked: “Why are the Soviet troops still stationed in our country?”, but ended with a the clear demand: “Ruszkik, haza!” - “Russians, go home!” From such a radical manifestation of the demands, you must have known that this was about to become dangerous?

The whole meeting started as a regular Communist youth organisation meeting. The Communist youth leaders gathered before it and reviewed the demands of the MEFESZ leaders, like András Lejtényi. When they learn the radical nature of these, they became frightened and left immediately for higher authority, the Communist party representatives at the university. Then the MEFESZ leaders went to meet the gathered students, read their demands, and the MEFESZ had the day!

“There was a general feeling of freedom among the participants. Fear disappeared. Saying the truth was a standard, normal thing during the event that caused happiness and joy among the audience.”

Didn‘t you realise that, according the Soviet system of those days, your collective name was "Shut up!" Did you not know that the Aula microphones were only for the Party collaborators and that nobody else were supposed to talk?

Nobody thought of ‘Shut up!’ at that time. After the first few words, there was a general feeling of freedom among the participants. Fear disappeared. Saying the truth was a standard, normal thing during the event that caused happiness and joy among the audience. The principle of ‘Shut up!’ had accumulated an amount of pressure in everyone that just erupted then. The age of ‘sober thoughts’ ended and the demand of freedom and truth became prevalent for the university youth.

You were yourself working as a journalist those days, and on the 23rd of October the newspaper “Delmagyarorszag” published your article called “Az igazsag keresesenek utjan”. What was the essence of this article and what reactions did you get?

This article, titled the ways of finding the truth, summarised what I have just explained above. It is very typical that we were not even sure whether the article would appear at all. The official, Communist newspaper Délmagyarország reported the event but left out the most important aspect which was the break of the dam, the shedding of the Communist oppression!

The period of hope to win over the mighty Soviet Union by peaceful measures, however, did not last long, and soon fights started spreading all over Hungary and the revolution began before your eyes. How will you describe this outcome of your efforts from the Aula assembly?

The main fighting happened in Budapest. This was the obvious and visible sign of the revolution. The fighting, the combat on the streets. The AVO, the armed troops and the Soviet soldiers were all surprised that ‘here they shoot back’. It was believed that a demonstration of force with tanks on the street would frighten people and prevent the escalation of the events, thus helping the consolidation of the Communist dictatorship. It didn’t happen like that.

Probably the Hungarian national character contributed to this as well. The courage to start again, to love one’s country, the national tradition of not giving in to slavery.

The revolutionaries of Budapest used bottles filled with petrol against tanks. They had no heavy weapons or anti-tank artillery. They fixed a burning piece of rag on the bottle and tossed it to the moving vehicle. The burning liquid turned the steel monsters into burning coffins. When the Soviet soldiers were abandoning their vehicles, they became easy preys to the weapons of the fighters.

There was an interrelation between the demands of the Szeged students, the fighting in Budapest and the revolutionary state nation-wise. The mental preparation rallied the fighters. The machine guns and the words were equally weapons of the revolution. Words changed things without bloodshed. From the smallest villages in Hungary to any institution or organisation, everyone of them had revolutionary councils. They replaced the very often incompetent previous leadership whose only added value to the system was their loyalty to the oppressing regime. The highest authority in the Communist state, the Central Committee and the Political Committee was simply dismissed. Instead of them reliable and trustworthy people were elected by the population or members of institutions or organisations. With open or secrets ballots. I was elected by a secret ballot to be on the workers’ council of the press in Szeged, and on the city’s revolutionary council.

I think this was the real result of the revolution. Replacing the old, Soviet puppets, the Communist leadership, and raising new, honest people into the power. This was created by the synergy of the students’ wishes and of the fighting in Budapest.

“For those who have never lived in oppression, in fear and in deprivation, for those who, on a daily basis, enjoy freedom and the rights of liberty, they probably don’t really know what freedom means for a prisoner.”

It has been said that something nearly supernatural stirred the hearts, minds and consciousness of the Hungarian people those days. Those shared feelings with friends and strangers must have been very special?

This special, disturbing experience is not difficult to describe for those who lived through it. The beautiful memories must be recalled from the past half-century. For those who have never lived in oppression, in fear and in deprivation, for those who, on a daily basis, enjoy freedom and the rights of liberty, they probably don’t really know what freedom means for a prisoner. I believe that it was this everlasting desire for freedom that prevailed back then. It was as if we were not even walking on the face of the Earth, as if floating in air. The communication changed among people, they were smiling to each other. They were nice, understanding towards each other. We even believed that the ‘guards’, our oppressors could change because they would realise that it is, in fact, better to live like this, free. It is probably also true that the experience of freedom created delusions.

By mid November 1956, it became evident that your revolution was lost. Not only the street fights, but also the lengthy demands of the students, which were fully supported by the whole society, were not going to be met. Instead, more and more of reprisals and arrests happened and an air of bitter disillusionment began to replace the heady days of the victorious revolution. How would you describe these days?

In the first days of November, it became obvious that the revolution had failed. Not in its results, not in its memories, not in its principles but in its survival. It was not our weakness but the overwhelming Soviet military power that defeated it. The twelve days a freedom turned into a totally different direction. In a few days we suddenly had to realise that those who had pretended to be with us till the 4th of November in 1956, turned into bloodthirsty puppets of the occupying forces and lost their human faces, becoming willing executioners.

The new puppet regime with Soviet arms behind it could only gradually strengthen its own position. They were expecting results, agreements, and waiting for their supporters t show once again. This started very slowly with the dismissed Communist leaders and members appearing again and again. Once they were feeling safe, the brutal punishment started.

We were hoping that they might have learnt their lesson, that we could not be treated the same way as we had been treated for nine years before the revolution. This was not the case, they continued everything in much the same way as it had been before. Everything came back, the deportation camps, the beatings, the prisons, the torture. Hungary again became a prison and we again humiliated prisoners.

It took some time before the Soviet rulers of your country were able to close the borders completely, and Austria was very willingly letting thousands of refugees cross into their country. You decided not to leave, why was that?

It became obvious that for those who had participated in the revolution, there was no place in Hungary any more. And many of them indeed left the country. Maybe some left because of fear, some because of adventure or new possibilities. Almost 200.000 people left the country. One of my best friend left who is currently living in New York while I was kept in a Soviet military prison in Eastern Hungary. Another friend of mine, who was briefly arrested with me, was inviting me to go to France.

It had never occurred to me that I could or would leave. Never, for a moment. I knew that I had account for all my activities eventually, and I was hoping that my life would be spared. During the revolution I did not fight, did not kill anyone. In my captivity Major Zokov, the Russian officer was interrogating me about all these things. Ha was trying to convince me that we were counter-revolutionaries while I was trying to convince him that we were revolutionaries. We couldn’t convince each other of course. I do not recall any fear gripping me, when, together with seven of my colleagues, I was transported in an ambulance, escorted by two armed armoured personnel carriers. I was wearing a white shirt and, when we were disembarked at the main square of Csongrád to be taken to the nearby hills, I remember thinking that anyone could easily recognise the white on a corpse, and might be able to inform my mother about my fate. I was not executed, but taken to Debrecen to the Soviet military airfield.

After I was released from prison, I did not want to leave. I couldn’t leave my country. I would not replace Hungary for any other place. I have seen a few peaceful spots in the world where life could be different than here. Once a Hungarian poet has said that for a Hungarian patriot ‘whether your faith may be blessed or cursed, here [ie. in Hungary] you must either live or die’. This is a moral command for me.

Some of your fellow students were executed and the Soviet jails were filling up during the next few months. You were among them arrested, hence it would be interesting to hear your personal story from the time after the revolution was so brutally crushed?

In the spring of 1957 I was arrested again, this time by the Hungarian political police. But before that an interesting episode happened in my life. When I was released from the Soviet prison, in February I returned to Szeged where I was approached by the newly organising Communist party, through two veteran leaders, Vince Bite and Károly Csíszár. I used to know Uncle Vince, since when I was ten to twelve, I used to be his helper in playing bowling at the beach. They told me to become member of the MSZMP [the newly formed Communist party] because I had been selected to be chief editor of the Délmagyarország newspaper. I had three days to consider their offer. I turned it down. Have you given it enough thoughts? Uncle Vince asked me. I have, I told him. Well, I hope you won’t regret it, he answered.

In two months time, I was arrested. I was interned. The whole thing became only a little bit clearer when I was released after one year. The temporary imprisonment that required no court verdict, could be prolonged indefinitely after every six months. When I was released, I was only allowed to do manual labour, only as a non-qualified worker, despite having a university degree with a certificate that allowed me to teach. My driving license was withdrawn, my reserve officer rank of the army was taken away, I did not get a passport, and could not travel abroad. As I recall, it did not really effect me because after finishing secondary school, I went to work on the Tisza bridge and learnt the craftsmanship of carpenters. This enabled me to work with my own two hands, and solved my financial problems.

What was difficult was the social exclusion. When my friends saw me on the streets, they went to the other side. Nobody dared speaking to me, or to be seen in the company of a convicted ‘counter revolutionary’. I was living with my mother and with my elder sister because I had lost my elder brother who had died in Russian captivity in the war.

During the sixties the terror had waned a little bit. I was allowed to teach in elementary school, although only subjects that were practical based, handcrafts. On regular basis a political officer appeared to check on me, and to try to make me work with them as an agent. I refused, and eventually got fed up with it all, and I returned to the construction industry. In the end I became a foreman, then a project manager. I was applying for eight years to the Szeged university law faculty but was always turned down. In the late 80s I was invited to be as chief editor of one of the first independent publishers. This was already the end of the Kádár-regime [János Kádár was the leader of Communist Hungary after 1956, till 1989. The period between 1956 and 1989 was often referred as the Kádár-regime.]

“It was only after many years that we learnt that the USA and the Great Britain informed the USSR that they would not oppose their intervention in Hungary.”

The governments of the free world watched your Hungarian Revolution with deep admiration even if none of them seriously considered providing military support, nor condemnation strong enough to stop the brutal actions of the Soviet Union. How do you view the behaviours of the Western countries those days?

The Western world provided enormous help to those almost 200.000 Hungarians who left the country. Those who went not as adventurers were appreciated by their new countries. Among the refugees you can find people who still come back to Hungary and who in fact, have two countries now. They have no roots, and their children have departed from Hungary for good.

The Western influence that we had in the days of the revolution was deceiving. It was only after many years that we learnt that the USA and the Great Britain informed the USSR that they would not oppose their intervention in Hungary.

Radio Free Europe was continuously encouraging the fighters to carry on because they were promised foreign help. This has led me to conclude that if it succeeds, if we had national local government in Szeged, I would suggest to change the name of Roosevelt Square in Szeged (like it was changed from Stalin Square) as I cannot support a liar, a friend of Soviets, even if he had been once the President of the USA.

Roosevelt Square in Szeged. The inscription lauds Franklin for his stand against
Fascism. Dénes Fejér, however, wants to change the name of the square.
“I cannot support a liar, a friend of the Soviets, even if he had been once
President of the USA,” he tells me.

Category : Featured black / Historical Lithuania

Why do so few know about Lithuania’s Soviet resistance after WWII?

- Posted by - 8261(3) Comment2011-08-08+11%3A09%3A230df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D8261

Back cover of Laima Vince’s book
“Forest Brothers: The Account Of An Anti-Soviet Freedom Fighter - Juozas Lukša.”

I have travelled in several former Warsaw Pact countries. In Hungary I met a person who participated in their 1956 uproar. In Slovakia and the Czech Republic I talked to people about their ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968. The people I talked to were rightfully proud of the uproars their countries performed against the mighty USSR, but when I asked them about the revolts that took place here in Lithuania and the other two Baltic states during the period of 1944-53, they all lacked concrete answers and knowledge. “We simply didn’t know,” they told me...

And they are not alone. I believe very few in the entire world have ever heard about the guerrilla war that took place here in the very centre of Europe after World War II, even if the number of victims in fact can be compared to the Vietnam War (1960-75).

It has been estimated that the losses of the Lithuanian partisan war’ amounted to 70,000 Soviet soldiers and 22,000 Lithuanian ‘Forest Brothers’, making this war one of the longest and bloodiest guerrilla wars in the history of the world.

For comparison, the United States lost 58,000 soldiers in Vietnam.

The outcome of this uneven war became an extremely sad and gruesome chapter in Lithuania’s history. Some 132,000 individuals were captured and deported to the Arctic areas of Siberia, 70% of them children and women, and more than 50,000 of these fine people died under the extremely harsh conditions up north, never able to return to their homeland alive.

During the same period, another 200,000 people were thrown into prisons. Over 150,000 of them were sent to the Gulags, the USSR’s concentration camps. These mass deportations continued until the death of Josef Stalin in 1953, but many prisoners remained in the camps also during the time of Nikita Khrushchev.

In a book by Anatol Marchenko published in Germany in 1973, he tells about his experiences from Soviet prisons and concentration camps in the early 1960s. One of his stories is about three Lithuanian prisoners who tried to escape from the convoy in a forest. Two of them were quickly caught, then shot many times in the legs, then ordered to get up which they could not do, then kicked and trampled by guards, then bitten and torn up by police dogs and only then stabbed to death with bayonets. All this with witty remarks by the officer, of the kind; "Now, free Lithuania, crawl, you'll get your independence straight off!"

This is one of thousand stories you can read in many now available books about the Soviet horrors. From 1917 to 1991, politics in the USSR started and finished with the Communist Party; it was the only game in town.

What passed for elections were a contest between members of the same political party - no candidates other than communists were allowed to run. The people who ruled the country were dictators; some more brutal than others. The Communist Party owned everything - land, factories, housing, and farms. The masses went about their daily lives under the direction of the Party. They were told where to live, where to work, and where to travel. There was very little freedom of choice in anything. The ideal behind this system was that everyone lived and worked for the good of the community.

But, the power of the Soviet Union, under the domination of Russia, was built on sand not rock. Under communism, individuals learned to lie back and do nothing and the idea of everything being owned by the community instead of individuals meant that nobody felt responsible for upkeep and maintenance; or as it is expressed in a Spanish proverb: "The cow of many is well milked and badly fed."

But even if there existed both humor and good days for people during those years, the extreme sufferings the USSR meant for this part of Europe should never be forgotten, and the Lithuanian partisan war is certainly one of the most important stories to tell our posterities along with the stories about Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956.

I suggest you to read the books of Laima Vince (Forest Brothers: The Account Of An Anti-Soviet Freedom Fighter -Juozas Lukša), Ruta Sepetys (Between shades of gray) and Antanas Sileika (Underground).

Have a look at their web pages:

LAIMA VINCE – http://www.laimavince.com/forestbrothers.html
RUTA SEPETYS – http://www.betweenshadesofgray.com/
ANTANAS SILEIKA – http://antanassileika.ca/

Aage Myhre,
Editor-in-Chief

Category : Featured / Historical Lithuania

- Posted by - 7994(1) Comment2011-07-31+05%3A08%3A330df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D7994

Chronicle of Lithuania
in a global perspective

Lithuania is a country that cannot be understood if you don’t know at least
something about its exceptional past and its extraordinary global ties – with
Italy, India, South Africa, Israel, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Crimea/Turkey,
Sweden, Germany, Russia, Australia and America

LITHUANIA - IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

A Chronicle of historic and contemporary Lithuania and her relations to the world

6 July 1253 – the day Lithuania’s only king was crowned

- Posted by - 7126(0) Comment2011-07-06+12%3A50%3A190df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D7126

Coronation of King Mindaugas (Adomas Varnas, 1952 m.)

6 July is Lithuania’s State Day and a national holiday. On this day, Lithuanians honour the coronation of Mindaugas, who became the first and only king of a unified Lithuania in 1253.

By Tomas Venclova, historian

The first Lithuanian ruler, Mindaugas (ca. 1200 – fall 1263), is wreathed in mystery and ambiguity―almost as much as St. Christopher on Vilnius’ coat of arms. His rise occurred at a time when Lithuania first confronted the German knights, the so-called Knights of the Teutonic Order. Like most founders and unifiers of nations, Mindaugas probably was not a very attractive character. He did away with the majority of his opponents (among them, quite a few of his relatives), adopted Christianity, was crowned King by the Pope, but then broke with Christianity after his wife’s death―in any case, that is what the Teutonic Knights claimed. His wife’s sister, who was married to Grand Duke Daumantas, came to the funeral. According to the story, “The king shamelessly violated the law, robbing the woman of her honor by force and keeping her as his wedded wife.” Daumantas killed Mindaugas and fled to the Russian city of Pskov, where he adopted the Orthodox Christian faith. He became a famous ruler and was later canonized. Meanwhile, for a good half-century the Lithuanian state disappeared from history: what happened during this time is beyond reliable historical knowledge.

What is clear is that there were no longer any kings, only grand dukes. (After the First World War an attempt was made to restore the old monarchy. When the German Prince von Urach was called to the throne, he intended to call himself Mindaugas II. But the idea never went beyond this operetta-like plan.) Historians, relying less on documents than on patriotism, have been trying to prove that the story of Mindaugas is connected with Vilnius: he was said to have been crowned and murdered in this settlement. In any case, he is credited with having built the first cathedral, whose Romanesque ruins can be found in the vaulted cellars of the present-day Cathedral. When Daumantas took revenge against Mindaugas, they say, the cathedral again became a pagan place of worship. Ardent supporters of this tale have even found twelve stone steps and the sacrificial altar of the cult site.

Admittedly, like most stories from that period, this one has a touch of the absurd. Still, Mindaugas became the symbol of the threatened state. Not long ago, a memorial to him was erected at the mouth of the Vilnia. A somewhat naïve play* portrays him as the first Lithuanian patriot. It influenced the generation that subsequently took to the barricades for the liberation of the country from Communism. Nevertheless, the true founder of the city was not Mindaugas, but Gediminas, a ruler who came to power after this “blank” period in the history of Vilnius.

Category : Featured / Historical Lithuania

- Posted by - 6883(3) Comment2011-06-29+11%3A22%3A190df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D6883

How did communism influence Lithuania's economic development?

A report by: Valdas Samonis
The Institute for New Economic Thinking, USA

Photo: http://www.landesa.org/where-we-work/more/lithuania/

In 1940, independent Lithuania produced per capita 1.9 times more meat, 2.8 times more milk, had 1.9 times more cattle and 2.7 times more pigs than Soviet Union. After 50 years of allegedly astounding economic progress, Soviet Lithuania had become dependent on subsidies from Moscow. To the extent that this assertion is true, how is this possible if not for the inefficiencies caused by the forcefully imposed system of central planning with its associated distortions?

Following its forceful incorporation into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1940, Lithuania was subjected to the Soviet development model based on Marxism-Leninism, as interpreted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as its theoretical underpinning; the first "scientifically based economic system in human history", as Bolsheviks claimed. The Bolshevik interpretation of economic processes and development goals was made obligatory in both the theoretical and practical dimensions. New methods of economic management /central planning/ were introduced which deeply changed the entire decision-making processes. The country's economic administration was completely overhauled. The Soviet occupation of Lithuania lasted nearly half a century.

Valdas Samonis

"I believe that the abject failure of Western experts (economists, political scientists, sociologists, etc) to foresee the impending USSR's total collapse under the weight of the communist system's own inefficiency (like an old mushroom in Lithuania's forest) was largely due to Western anti-anti-communism; it grossly exaggerated the Soviet communist regime's stability and legitimacy. The so called "scientific-based system" lie repeated by the Soviets with Goebbels efficiency and force, gave rise to that Western anti-anti-communism and it was the greatest Bolshevik deception (brilliant, indeed!) that all those "good-heart" Western intellectuals fell for.

What an intellectual shame to Western universities and other elites!"

HELD BACK IN THE USSR:

RETARDING EFFECTS OF COMMUNISM ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LITHUANIA

Valdas Samonis

The Institute for New Economic Thinking, USA

Dedicated To Those Dead or Alive Whose Blood and Brains Made Free Lithuania Possible

ABSTRACT. Even if it brought some peculiar kind of economic growth /rather of cancer type/, the communist system imposed by the USSR has taken Lithuania's and other formerly oppressed countries' comparative economic development levels at least two-three decades back. This essay gives the first approximation of direct, roughly measurable retarding effects of communism /sovietization/ on economic development /summarily captured by the proposed Communist Retardation Indicator (TM), CRI/. It leaves out various kinds of negative indirect effects, e.g. huge human costs. The essay serves as a reality check on inflated expectations regarding the welfare effects /living standards/ of the transition processes in former communist countries some twenty years after the start of transitions to markets and democracy. The growth slowdown and the rise in unemployment in such countries as Lithuania, other Baltics, Poland, etc, are due in a large part to the legacies of the communist system catching up with and neutralizing considerable efforts at continued reforms. Such a reality check is useful for shaping further transformation policies so that they are better grounded in what is possible and advisable under the circumstances. Clearly, it will take a long time to fully recover from the "benefits" showered on Lithuania and other formerly communist countries by the “scientifically based” Soviet communist system.

1. Introduction

Following its forceful incorporation into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1940, Lithuania was subjected to the Soviet development model based on Marxism-Leninism, as interpreted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as its theoretical underpinning; the first “scientifically based economic system in human history”, as Bolsheviks claimed. The Bolshevik interpretation of economic processes and development goals was made obligatory in both the theoretical and practical dimensions. New methods of economic management /central planning/ were introduced which deeply changed the entire decision-making processes. The country's economic administration was completely overhauled. The Soviet occupation of Lithuania lasted nearly half a century.

After the period of heroic armed resistance during 1945-1953, the Lithuanian struggle for freedom adopted less dramatic methods and more covert forms. However, with the advent pf Gorbachev’s perestroika, the Lithuanian drive for independence intensified and adopted open forms since 1988. This provoked a harsh reaction in Moscow. Among a number of the lines of criticism, the alleged economic irrationality of such ambitions stands out. Soviet officials maintained that Lithuania has gained a lot from its "accession" to the USSR: what in 1940 was an underdeveloped, agricultural country, by 1990 was transformed into a developed, industrial Soviet republic. This essay sets out to verify such claims.

The main problem is that after the forceful incorporation, most formerly used market economy based yardsticks and indicators of economic development were replaced by the new ones, adversely affecting the comparability in time and space. The matter has been further complicated by the secretive and distorting nature of Soviet statistics. All in all, the shortage of reliable data makes it all but impossible to come up with precise figures. However, some first approximation can be made.

The aim of the article is to examine claims regarding economic development under communism in some detail permitted by the availability and quality of data.

The main goals of the article are:

· To evaluate direct, roughly measurable effects of communism on economic development of Lithuania and propose the Communist Retardation Indicator (TM), CRI;

· To analyze the effects of communism by the sectors of economy;

· To indicate the main problems to be dealt with shaping further transformation policies for Lithuania, other post-Soviet countries.

The methods applied are the main methods of economic analysis and synthesis, management theories.

2. The Primary Sector

With three quarters of its labor force employed in agriculture, Lithuania was a predominantly agricultural economy in 1940. Half a century later, the agrocomplex still occupied a special role in the Lithuanian economy, providing about a quarter of jobs and more than half the national income [Zinkus 1986, 186; How Will... 1990]. As in 1938-1940, basic crop and milk yields in Lithuania were in general considerably lower than in neighboring Western countries /see Table 1/:

Table 1. The Comparison of Yields in Several Countries: Crops /in centners per hectare/ and Milk /in tonnes per cow/:

Rye Wheat Barley Milk

Year	1938	1987	1938	1987	1938	1987	1970	1987
Country:
Lithuania	12	28	12	39	13	31	2,9	3.6
Finland	16	22	20	23	16	25	3.7	5.0
Sweden	20	40	27	48	24	38	4.0	5.8
Denmark	20	38	35	-	34	45	3.9	5.9

Source:. [Lithuania's ... 1990].

Even more important and telling is a considerable lag behind the West in the indicators measuring the efficiency of agricultural production. In 1981-87, Lithuania reached roughly one fourth of the American labor productivity in agriculture [Lithuania's ...1990]. Generally, Lithuanian agricultural production costs were two to three times higher than in Western countries [How Will ...1990]. Yuri Maslyukov, Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee /Gosplan/, claimed that the Lithuanian agriculture was running at a loss of rb172 million to the central budget [A Discussion ...1990, 37]. How was this possible?

Noncommunist Lithuania fed and clothed its citizens without any assistance from abroad during the interwar independence period. And the levels of agricultural production were high by comparison to the Soviet Union; in 1940, independent Lithuania produced per capita 1.9 times more meat, 2.8 times more milk, had 1.9 times more cattle and 2.7 times more pigs. After 50 years of allegedly astounding economic progress, Soviet Lithuania has become dependent on subsidies from Moscow [Terleckas 1990]. To the extent that this assertion is true, how is this possible if not for the inefficiencies caused by the forcefully imposed system of central planning with its associated distortions?

For decades, the mainstream of the Soviet economic literature attempted to present the system of central planning as perhaps not yet perfect in some respects but certainly - for the first time in human history -based on scientific foundations. Many authors claimed that because of the planned nature of the system – an embodiment of the scientific truth in economic management - it is capable of fully harnessing objective laws of science to work for the benefit of broad masses, thereby avoiding distortions and costs characteristic of the chaotic play of market forces under capitalism.

The reality has been diametrically opposite, however. Let's take just one example. The Soviet-style indicator of technological progress is the power of machines, their size, and their numbers: the larger, the better (“chem bolshe, tem luchshe”). The apocryphal story has it that, to prove their technological superiority, the Soviets were intending to build the world’s largest microcomputer!

The communist penchant for size led to the overproduction and overuse of very heavy machines like the Kirovets tractor K-700. The use of such a tractor is not only ecologically damaging but causes the hardening of soil, destroying its structure, drainage systems, and leading to the wheat harvest reduction by 30-50%! Similarly, it has been proved that such tractors, their excessive numbers, and other distortions have been detrimental to the agricultural production in Lithuania as well as the USSR in general [Aganbegyan 1988, 35-36; Wolfson 1988; Duda 1990]. It is estimated that just between 1961 and 1988 the losses in the Lithuanian agriculture as a result of systemic inefficiencies were more than rb90 billion [Lithuania's ...1990].

What is more important than the above losses is the impact of the sovietized economic structure and work ethic in agriculture on the prospects for a radical reform undertaken in Lithuania over the last decade. The forced collectivization and statization has been accompanied by a thorough and indeed criminal destruction of farmsteads and family farming in general. Privatization including the restitution of property is therefore the necessary precondition for the introduction of market forces [Hinds 1990; Balezentis 1990]. This proved to be difficult for at least two reasons. First, although collective farm lands can be distributed among individual families, there are no buildings nor machinery with which to work the land. Second, the whole way of life /family farming/ has been subjected to a "fifty-year moratorium" [Kazenas 1990]. The qualities of a farmer, proud and wise lord of land are close to extinction. There are agricultural workers instead, with little or no initiative and poor work ethic. The magnitude of change can only be compared to the transforming of feudal land laborers into peasant farmers. Family farming was criminally destroyed in a couple of years, its rebuilding will take decades [Vel ..1990; Laird 1990].

3. The Secondary Sector

The secondary sector in Lithuania is dominated by industry since mining is nonexistent due to the almost complete lack of natural resources. Soviet sources claim that Lithuania's industrial output has increased an impressive 84 times in the period of 1940-1990 and such industries as machine tools, ship-building, electrical engineering, etc, were created from zero [On the "Lithuanian ... 1990].

In light of rather recent revelations concerning the growth and relative size of the Soviet economy, it is hard to see how this figure could be taken at face value. For example, two glasnost era authors, Vasilii Seliunin and Grigorii Khanin [1987], argue pretty convincingly that in the 1928-85 period Soviet national income grew only 6-7 times and not some 90 times as officially claimed. The mystery may never be entirely solved. Central to the problem of separating inflation from real growth is the measurement of qualitative change in the absence of market verification which was the case under the Soviet system. It can be concluded at the very least, that the Soviet-style measurement of qualitative progress /using such "objective" characteristics as capacity, size, and weight/ may be at the root of a substantial upward bias in the official Soviet statistics [Kushnirsky 1989; 294-301].

There are some additional specific problems with the assertion about the rate of industrial growth in Lithuania. First, the latter part of the assertion provides explanation for the former one: such a high growth rate was recorded largely because the base year output was low or even zero.

It is a well-known statistical effect that base year quantities close to zero make it "easy" to achieve impressive growth rates. Second, most of this growth is of a peculiar, Soviet-type variety. For systemic reasons, the Soviet Union used much more input for a given quantity of output than is the case in the West. For instance, steel, oil, and gas were used in the USSR about three times less efficiently than in France or United Kingdom [If Gorbachev ...1985; Aslund 1989, 16-17]. Similarly, relative to Sweden or Finland, Lithuania consumed 1.5-2.0 times more energy, wood and metals per unit of output. Heating one square meter of living space in Finland requires about 20 kg of fuel, whereas in Soviet Lithuania - 60 kg [How Will ... 1990].

What this boils down to is growth for the sake of growth: more coal is mined to produce more metal which is used to build more mines so more coal is mined and so this environment-degrading "development" cycle goes on. To use a medical metaphor, it's a cancerous growth. Although their populations were forced to make huge sacrifices for development /20-40% or more of all the goods and services produced went to investment - a good measure of the rate of exploitation/, centrally- planned economies seemed never to mature, exhibiting features of permanently developing countries [Winiecki 1999; Zwass 1987, 172-176]. Third, the Soviet-type industrial growth forced on Lithuania disregarded the structure of its economy and human resources and produced excessive dependence on Soviet inputs, particularly raw materials. It is primarily Union-subordinate industries which were growing rapidly, using mainly /some 60-80%/ imported raw materials and shipping large parts /50-60%/ of their output out of Lithuania [Lithuania's ...1990]. This pattern of the division of labor may have well served Moscow's military and other imperial interests but hardly those of the Lithuanian people.

Indeed, the so called social efficiency of development which captures its welfare effects/the impact on living standards and quality of life/ has been very low in Soviet Lithuania and the USSR [Vasiliauskas 1990]. One Soviet economist estimated that in terms of per capita consumption of goods and services the USSR ranked between 50th and 60th among countries of the world [Jones & Moskoff 1989, xx]. Even if' there initially were some positive welfare effects of the Soviet-type industrial growth, very soon they were cancelled by the negative ones. It can therefore be concluded that what took place in Lithuania /and elsewhere in the communist world/ is the Soviet version of immiserizing growth [Bhagwati, Brechter and Hatta 1984]. Such a growth led to the pauperization of the country and its people, not unlike a cancer devastates a biological organism.

And just like the modern cancer therapy aims at cutting off supplies of essential nutrients to the cancerous tissue in order to starve it and liquidate the cancer, so communist-style economic growth stopped and the system entirely collapsed as soon as it exhausted the “easy” supplies of natural resources /oil, coal, etc/ and human resources /human patience, tolerance of communist serfdom and exploitation/ at the beginning of the 1990s.

All in all, labor productivity in the Lithuanian industry was much less than half the American level in 1988. It is estimated that just between 1960 and 1989 the losses in the Lithuanian industry as a result of systemic inefficiencies amounted to rb88 billion [Lithuania's ... 1990].

For the reform decades since 1990 and for the future, what may be more important than the absolute losses incurred under the Soviets are the legacies of communism /sovietization/ in the area of industrial structure and the economy and society in general. The Lithuanian industry was dominated by large, technologically /as opposed to economically/ specialized enterprises, usually enjoying a mono- or oligopolistic position. Such large, communist-style enterprises did not add economic value in the production process as the value of the output was in most cases lower than the value of raw materials, labor, other inputs, if both sides of the production equation are expressed in world prices.

This paradox is known under the term of “value subtraction” coined up by the famous Harvard economist Janos Kornai. As the Central European /and Lithuanian/ reform experience suggests, they are likely to use every means to oppose or sabotage demonopolization and market-oriented reforms in general. In Poland, the existence of a "hard core" of state-owned value-subtracting monopolies has proved to be one of the toughest problems to crack [Samonis 1990a]. Also, everywhere in the postcommunist world they proved to be a fertile breeding ground for the ex-communist nomenklatura /”red directors”/ who beyond a reasonable doubt proved their qualifications in distorting and/or subverting the necessary market-oriented reforms, especially at the microeconomic level [Samonis 1995].

Furthermore, world manufacturing is undergoing a revolution. The mass production model /economies of scale/ is being replaced by a model of a flexible, multi-product firm that emphasizes quality and speedy response to market conditions /economies of scope/ while using technologically advanced equipment and new forms of organization brought about the digital revolution [Milgrom & Roberts 1990; How to ... 1990; Winiecki 1987, 22-23; Samonis 2000]. In Lithuania, progress along these lines may be seriously hindered by the monopolistic "hard core" and a paucity of small-and mid-sized firms exhibiting high adaptability and innovativeness suitable for today’s global digital economy [Samonis 2000].

4. The Tertiary Sector

One of the salient characteristics of a modern economy is a rapid growth inthe provision of services. The tertiary sector usually employs some 60-80% of the labor force in the West. A service gap therefore provides one of the important measures of relative backwardness or retardation [Schroeder 1987; Aslund 1989, 19].

In Lithuania, the Moscow-imposed growth pattern /especially industrial hypertrophy/ has resulted in the development of a sizable service gap to the West. Based on communist ideological motivations, most services /so called nonproductive ones/ were treated as a second-rate activity.

Consequently, the allocation of resources for the tertiary sector was governed by the residual principle. Around 1980, some 37% of the Lithuanian labor force was employed in services, almost exactly the Soviet average. Most Western countries have reached this level around 1950 [Zinkus 1980, 25; Schroeder 1987; Parkola 1980]. By this important measure, both the Soviet Lithuanian and the Soviet economies lagged behind the West some 30 years if not more. They even fell behind many Third World countries [Aslund 1987, 19].

The sorry state of Soviet Lithuanian services was evident from even a cursory look at the health care, housing and communal services, transportation, and especially communication and financial services so crucial for a modern economy. With regard to the latter, the reign of abacus was unchallenged in most places [Uosis, Terleckas, Baldisis 1989, 16]. For the future, the biggest problem will precisely be the underdevelopment of communication and financial services where the gap between the USSR and the West was judged to be growing [Schroeder 1987]. The transition to a market economy is conditional upon a sufficient progress in the development of the financial sector which will have to replace the allocative functions of state bureaucracy.

5. The External Sector: Foreign Economic Relations

For smaller countries like Lithuania /population over 3 million/, international economic cooperation is of predominant importance. The nature and profitability of bilateral Soviet-Lithuanian relations and in general Soviet-Baltic economic relations have been a subject of much controversy.

5.1. Who Subsidized Whom and Whose System?

As soon as the Baltic drive for independence gathered momentum, the Soviet propaganda machine floated a multitude of comments and assertions designed to demonstrate the political and economic irrationality of independence movements. In particular, it was alleged that the Baltic republics have not been able to balance their current account vis a vis the rest of the USSR and have therefore been in a need to accept "the selfless and generous aid", that is subsidies, from other republics. Explicitly formulated or not, the obvious corollary of this type of assertions was that, in order to fulfill their ambitions for political power, Baltic leaders have not only been biting a feeding hand of "fraternal help" extended from Moscow but have been blindly pushing their people towards economic catastrophe [Borisov & Mikhailov 1990; Hammer 1990; Smulders 1990; On the "Lithuanian ... 1990; Maniusis 1976].

The issue has both the systemic and the quantitative aspect /quantity of development/. The former centers around the impact of communism /sovietization/ on the nature of economic development /its quality/ of the Baltic states during the postwar period of occupation. It has been analyzed above and also in Samonis [1991a]. Let's try to look at the quantitative aspect of development.

Moscow's propaganda machine has been constantly drumming up the fact that Soviet Union/Russia supplied Lithuania with cheap raw materials, natural gas /rb28 as opposed to $97 for 1,000 cubic meters on the world market/, and oil /rb30 as opposed to $110 a ton on the world market/ at the beginning of the Lithuanian independence [How Will ...1990]. At the same time, Lithuanian exports to the USSR /mainly food and manufactured consumer goods/ were seen as overpriced. It was argued that goods of comparable quality can be bought cheaper in the West. These distortions in relative prices affecting the terms of the Lithuanian-Soviet trade are interpreted as "the selfless and generous aid of the Russian people" /subsidies/ to Lithuania [Maniusis 1976, 102; Hammer 1990; et al.].

It is impossible to fully prove or disprove this sort of claims. Such is the dubious "beauty" of the centrally-planned economy that nobody really knows the rationale or the real value of internal flows of goods and services. The system of arbitrary, bureaucratic pricing and decision-making effectively clouds the issue. However, for at least three reasons it is hard to see how the subsidy interpretation could be based on anything more than vague impressions.

First, it is useful to keep in mind a simple truth rooted in the classical economics that if the productive factor endowment of the integrating countries /e.g. Lithuania and the USSR/ is different from the rest of the world, relative prices within the “union” will differ from relative prices in the world market [Brada 1985]. It is obvious that the Soviet Union --as the natural resource-richest country in the world -- should sell its resources at the relative prices lower than the rest of the world. For the highest technologically developed countries /e.g. Japan or USA/, the same is true for sophisticated manufactured goods. Enter a restrictive, autarkic, trade-diverting, and genuine trade-destroying “union” between Lithuania and the USSR: Lithuanian TV sets of comparable quality will necessarily be priced higher than Japanese ones on account of a difference in the development level causing productivity differentials. Relative prices in the Lithuanian-Soviet trade reveal nothing more than different conditions prevailing in the union [Holzman 1987, 187-201; Desai 1985].

Second, superimposed upon the quantity of development factors are systemic inefficiencies /described above/ working in the same direction. Production of the highly processed goods /like TV sets/ is exposed to more and larger systemic inefficiencies than the exploitation of natural resources under communism. Combined with the usual Soviet-type formula for price formation based on the cost-plus principle, this distorts relative prices even further.

Third, the Lithuanian labor productivity consistently topped the Soviet averages: the level by some 7% and the rate of growth by about 8.6 percentage points. Never during the entire postwar period has Lithuania used up its extra wealth /compared to the USSR/. The bigger portion of the extra value created thanks to better economic management never found its way to the consumption or savings funds [Terleckas 1990; Aleskaitis 1990].

The above three reasons are inconsistent with the Soviet subsidy interpretation. Rather the opposite is suggested by the third one. What happened to some of the extra value created in Lithuania and how? Let's try to answer this question below.

The Gosplan chairman Yuri Maslyukov claimed that investments in the Lithuanian economy were close to rb50 billion between 1966 and 1989 [A Discussion ... 1990]. Soviet sources often quote this and other figures within the context suggesting Moscow's assistance to Lithuania. However, 19% of this amount were funds of kolkhozes /collective farms/ and residents of Lithuania, according to the Lithuanian State Committee for Statistics. Of rb14.8 billion which were allocated to agriculture, central state funds account for only 60% [Lithuania's ...1990].

According to the Lithuanian Ministry of Economy, in the last 25 years preceding independence Union-subordinate enterprises and organizations transferred rb8.9 billion to the Union budget or 2.3 times the amount received in centralized capital investments. Additionally, they transferred to centralized Union funds more than 1 billion in foreign exchange rubles and almost rb99 billion in turnover tax. On top of these open transfers come hidden forms of resource withdrawal from Lithuania. One of them is the withdrawal of credit resources at the discretion of the USSR Council of Ministers. Just in 1988, the increase in credit resources withdrawn from the republic was rb854 million, and in 1980-88 the sum of these funds left under the USSR Council of Ministers authority increased from rbl.2 to rb4.1 billion. It is estimated that in 1980-88 Lithuania's economy lost rb728 million in revenue /rbl.6 billion when recalculated at compound interest/ [Lithuania's ... 1990]. As of July 1, 1989, credit resources created in Lithuania reached rb10.5 billion, of which about rb6 billion were disposed of by Moscow. Although Lithuania accounted for only about 1.3% of the Soviet population, its credit resources covered 9.5% of the budget deficit gap filled with borrowed funds in 1989. At the same time, Lithuanian people suffered from the shortage of credit funds, receiving only rb86 million, whereas their savings exceeded rb6 billion. The Soviet-type credit system was turned into the most important channel for the unilateral transfer of income from Lithuania to the USSR [Uosis, Terleckas, Baldisis 1989, 13-15].

To illustrate the above with some microeconomic data, let's look at the flows of capital resources to and from the Vilnius "Elfa" Production Association which was quoted by Gosplan's Maslyukov as receiving 77% of its five-year plan investment funds from Moscow [On the "Lithuanian ...1990, 56]. In a quarter of a century ended in 1988, “Elfa” received rb34 million and 3 million worth of foreign exchange rubles in centralized capital investments and transferred rb86 million of profits to the Union budget and additional rb74 million to the Union ministry. The profits created at "Elfa" and transferred to Moscow were therefore 3.3 times higher than the central funds allocated. In a classical “double standard” mentality, contributions to the central funds were mandatory but allocations of money from them are conveniently interpreted as “assistance” or “aid” [Lithuania's ...1990; Zinkus 1986, 186].

From the above confrontation of figures, it is evident that Moscow has received handsome returns on its investments in Lithuania. In most cases, the rate of return has been higher than in other, less developed republics. Therefore, to talk about "the selfless and generous aid of the Russian people" where a normal for profit investment activity is carried out is a cardinal misunderstanding or rather the intentionally misleading propaganda.

The flip side of the forced reorientation towards the USSR has been a complete destruction of Lithuania's economic ties with the West /mainly United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium/, painstakingly developed during the interwar independence period. The interwar Lithuania's per capita foreign trade was rising almost continuously and reached levels three times higher than those of the USSR. Its share in the world exports more than doubled while its currency was among the two or three strongest in the world [Terleckas 1990; Ten Years ... 1938, 72-78; Vaisnoras 1990]. As a result of occupation, Lithuania had to forego multiple benefits flowing from foreign trade in general and the cooperation with the advanced market economies in particular. Only about 2% of its trade was with the West at the start of post-Soviet independence.

One more point needs to be addressed here. Soviet and even some Western literature emphasizes bigness of the internal market /country size/ as a fundamental strength in economic development; therefore advocates of the Lithuanian independence are often accused of encouraging the formation of a state that is to small to be economically viable. At best, this is an outdated, 19^th century thinking. According to the latest research conducted by the University of Pennsylvania economist Prof. Robert Summers, the average annual growth in per capita income in the bottom 50% of countries as measured by the population size was faster than in the larger countries from 1960 to the mid-1980s. Per capita incomes also tend to be higher in smaller countries.

Being a part of the "vast homeland", quite apart from its specific nature, was therefore more of a liability rather than an asset. Among the reasons are: smaller countries tend to be more active traders in the world market which is the same whether you live in the large USSR or smaller Lithuania; they tend to specialize in the growing number of products that do not require large domestic markets; small homogenous economies tend to suffer less from the inefficiencies created by a heavy-handed government intervention aimed at mediating regional and sectoral conflicts of interest [Becker 1990].

A distorted structure of incentives under the Soviet communist-style central, inward-oriented development strategy, and the emergence of two separate markets (undemanding internal Soviet and COMECON markets and the demanding world market) interacted in generating a peculiar dual export structure of communist economies with adverse implications for the prospects of successful reorientation of exports to the demanding world market [Winiecki 1999].

5.1.1. Looking into the Distorting Goskomstat Mirror: An Exercise in Meaninglessness

An exercise in analyzing the static aspect of Baltic-Soviet economic relations has been presented by the European Economic Community [Stabilization ...1990]. Based on the Soviet /Goskomstat/ merchandise trade statistics for 1988, the European Union (European Economic Community or EEC at the time) paper paints a picture of large negative Baltic trade balances with the USSR. It takes a pretty strong faith in the reliability and completeness of the Goskomstat data to undertake such an exercise, and especially to treat it seriously. After some three decades of studying the Soviet-type economies from the comparative perspective, I must admit I do not have this kind of faith. Why?

First of all, merchandise trade constitutes only part of the current account balance. The Baltic states have not been paid by Moscow for the use of their transit services; Baltic sea ports have for centuries been Russia's very important window to the world. Generally, whatever proceeds have been generated in the service sector, including tourism, have been channeled directly to Moscow with no credit to Baltic current accounts. Second, supplies for the 400,000 or so strong Soviet army stationed in the Baltics have been counted as imports. Moreover, Moscow has not paid for the use or pollution of the Baltic territory by its military. There is no information whatsoever on several very important aspects of Baltic-Soviet relations, like financing and supplies for the Communist Parties, KGB, and other bodies alien and harmful to the Baltic interests.

Moreover, a snapshot of inter-republican trade provided by the EEC paper may not be representative for the whole Soviet period. This is certainly true for the Baltic states. Some of them may have indeed slipped into merchandise trade deficit with the USSR in some years towards the end of the 1980s. First of all, this has to do with a general decline in the Soviet economic activity, particularly with the worsening Soviet foreign trade balance exacting a differential impact on Baltic trade flows in and out of the USSR. However, a totally different picture may be true for the entire Soviet period. According to alternative data, which provide a fuller account of, for example, cross-border shopping, Latvia achieved a cumulative merchandise trade surplus of over 9% for the period of 1961-1988; the surplus rises to more than 23%, if services are included to complete the current account picture [Smulders 1990, Table III].

With some qualifications /page 77/, the ECE paper maintains that, since data on the external trade of the republics are available in both domestic and foreign trade prices /a proxy for world market prices/, it is possible to compute the gain that a distorted Soviet price structure confers on certain republics. However, great statistical uncertainties and inaccuracies of the transformation of what is essentially an arbitrary set of prices into world market prices make such an exercise rather meaningless. This is seen not only by Western authors [e.g. Schroeder 1992] but also, in the article entitled "Let's Return Trust to Statistics", by the Goskomstat chairman himself [Kirichenko 1990]!

In the absence of any system of national accounts at the republican level, the Baltic-Soviet current accounts are heavily influenced by what can be termed the Soviet-type capital account. The evidence coming from the Baltic sources suggests that inequitable financial relations with the USSR introduce still more distortions. Due to the Soviet practice of levying subsidies at the location of production rather than consumption, the presence of subsidies reduces the value of exportables. Consequently, export volume for large net agricultural exporters /Lithuania, Estonia/ is downwardly biased due to the high percentage of subsidies contained in the retail price. In Lithuania, these subsidies represented 30-40% of the product's value [Karlsson & Van Arkadie 1991, 213; Hanson 1991b].

More generally, distortions arose via the unified Soviet banking system. The central banks used to continuously redistribute cash and credit resources between the republics and the center. In the 44 postwar years, Latvia transferred to the center nearly twice as much in cash and credit resources than it received which has resulted in about 34 billion rubles subsidy to the USSR. Similarly, union-subordinate enterprises in Lithuania transferred to Moscow more than twice the amount of centralized capital investments received. The Soviet banking system served as the most important channel for unilateral transfers of capital resources from the Baltic states to the USSR. In particular, redistribution of proceeds from exports reduced the gains from Soviet trade while worsening the notorious shortage-type economy. Under the conditions of normal, equitable financial relations with the USSR, additional resources would have been available to Baltic states for imports of oil and/or other natural resources [Smulders 1990; Samonis 1991a]. This latter observation may be irrelevant from the current accounting point of view but it surely bears on who subsidized whom and whose system.

The above outlined distortions in the Baltic-Soviet economic relations are only part of the problem but I believe this is enough to convey the magnitude of the entire problem. Consequently, it is very difficult to see how assertions of subsidizing the Baltic states by the USSR could have possibly been based on any merits. To the extent that central investments in the Baltics could be regarded as autonomous, e.g. profit-seeking, rather than compensating flows, these assertions cannot be true even in the absence of distortions [Hanson 1991b]. I am in a complete agreement with the Economic Survey of the Baltic Republics undertaken under the auspices of the Swedish government; the survey, which contains a calculation similar to one described in the EEC paper, concludes that such exercises are of dubious value. [Karlsson & Van Arkadie 1991, 193]. They certainly cannot be taken as any approximation of what would Baltic current accounts look like under the conditions of full de facto independence.

Indeed, the evidence for 1989 and later years seems to point to the possibility of a balanced Latvian current account even with realistic Russian energy prices. The two other Baltic governments also maintained they were approaching a balance [Buchan 1991; Hanson 1991a & b; Department of ...1991].

6. The Comparative Development Levels: In Search for a Measure of Communist Retardation

Gross national product per head of the population /GNP per capita/ is the most comprehensive measure of the economic development level. In Europe, Lithuania was a lesser developed country during the interwar period of independence. This fact has to be put into perspective, though.

From 1795 until the World War I /for 120 years/ Lithuania was under Russian colonial yoke and suffered brutal repressions for its numerous attempts to free itself. During the World War I it had to carry the burden of German occupation. The occupying Germans dismantled Lithuania's productive capacities and destroyed them with pedantic precision. The ensuing war for independence wreaked even more economic havoc. According to one estimate, total losses incurred as a result of the German occupation and the war for independence amounted to 5 billion litas /Lithuanian currency, US$1 = approx. 10 litas at the time/ or 3.5 times more than the Lithuanian national income in 1924. A national cohesion was almost nonexistent. Arguments were advanced that Lithuania could not survive as an economic entity [Terleckas 1990; Simutis 1942, 19].

Yet the Herculean task of reconstruction was undertaken with steadfast determination. The growth of the Lithuanian economy averaged 10% annually, a rate impressive by any standards [Terleckas 1990; Ten Years ...1938, 4]. Moreover, unlike during the Soviet period, the social efficiency of development was pretty high. Suffice it to say that the average industrial wage could support a family of four [Maciuika 1955]. Something like this was impossible after 50 years of the Soviet-style "scientifically based system". It can be argued that by 1940 Lithuania has been brought within some 10 years distance to advanced Western countries, e.g. Scandinavia.

Official Soviet sources claim that the USSR national income grew about 90 times in 1928-85. Perhaps the most sensational product of glasnost is the publication an alternative estimate by Vasilii Seliunin and Grigorii Khanin [1987] who put the growth at only 6-7 times. So far, independent Western estimates could not come up with anything more convincing. The history of Western attempts at calculating the Soviet GNP in dollar terms is littered with what subsequently invariably turned out to be rather substantial overstatements [Marer 1985; World Bank Atlas 1980-1983; various CIA assessments; et al.].

The Soviet GNP per capita has been put by some at about $2,000 in 1990 [Grossly ... 1990]. In all probability, this is still on the high side given that the International Monetary Fund /IMF/ estimated Poland's figure to be only $1,100 in 1990 [Lipton & Sachs 1990]. There are no good reasons to believe that the Lithuanian GNP per capita figure should not be on the order of magnitude of those of its neighbors. In fact, it was put by Soviet sources at rb 2,427 in 1988 or some 10% above the Soviet average of that year [On the "Lithuanian ... 1990, 7]. In 1990, it may therefore lie somewhere in the range of $1,000-2,000 which places Lithuania far below Western countries, particularly its Western neighbors. The Lithuanian State Committee for Statistics calculated that Lithuania produced rb128.6 billion of national income less than Finland and rb155.8 billion less than Sweden in 1960-89, and the gap continued to widen. Almost the entire volume of the national income produced during this period was rb154 billion [Lithuania's ... 1990]. Most Western countries reached or surpassed Lithuania's post-Soviet development level /that of 1990/ in the immediate postwar decade [World Tables 1971]. So Lithuania’s lag behind the West was at least three decades in 1990.

As a way to quantify all the above assertions, I hereby propose the Communist Retardation Indicator™ (CRI), summarily capturing the retarding effects of communism on economic development:

1. CRI = TDL – IDL; where:

CRI = Communist Retardation Indicator™

TDL= Total Developmental Lag to leading Western countries

IDL = Initial Developmental Lag prior to the imposition of communism

In the case of Lithuania:

2. CRI = 30 years – 10 years = 20 years

Taking into account interwar Lithuania's relative underdevelopment /IDL/ by a decade, the imposition of communism on Lithuania /sovietization/ resulted in NO LESS THAN TWO DECADES OF DEVELOPMENTAL RETARDATION during the fifty-year occupation period /40%/. Taking the CRI of 40% as the departure point, calculations can be made how much wealth Lithuania lost in dollar terms with regard to the reference Scandinavian country (e.g. Denmark) due to the Soviet communist occupation. This is not the aim of this essay, however.

Admittedly, this is a rough and ready measure and a very optimistic assessment. Other estimates /e.g. by French Government/ are a bit less optimistic and put the developmental retardation of more advanced Central European countries /e.g. Bulgaria, Romania, Poland/ at about a full generation or more, e.g. some 30 years [Mocilnikar 1999]. This would result in CRI closer to some 50-60%.

7. Conclusions

Even if it brought some peculiar kind of economic growth /rather of cancer type/, the communist system imposed by the USSR has taken Lithuania's and other formerly oppressed countries’ comparative economic development levels at least two-three decades back; they were held back in their development by the USSR. This essay gives just the first approximation of direct, roughly measurable retarding effects of communism /sovietization/ on economic development /summarily captured as the Communist Retardation Indicator, CRI/. It leaves out various kinds of negative indirect effects, e.g. huge human costs.

Since 1990, Lithuania is trying to implement radical political and economic reforms designed to restore its statehood and a market-type economy [see for example Samonis 2000b]. The overcoming of the legacy of the communist system will be hard, however, especially so that this essay leaves out some other significant costs, e.g. various kinds of negative indirect effects, e.g. human costs like killings, imprisonments, deportations, ensuing emigration, etc. The essay serves as a reality check on inflated expectations regarding the welfare effects of the transition processes in former communist countries some twenty years after the start of transitions to markets and democracy. The growth slowdown and the rise in unemployment in such countries as Lithuania, other Baltics, Poland, etc, is due in a large part to the legacies of the communist system catching up with and neutralizing considerable efforts at continued reforms. Such a reality check is useful for shaping further transformation policies so that they are better grounded in what is possible and advisable under these unfavorable circumstances.

Clearly, it will take a long time to fully recover from the "benefits" showered on Lithuania and other formerly communist countries by the Soviet communist system. As a highly distinguished Polish dissident economist [Winiecki 1999] put it, "the curse of the by then long extinct Soviet-type system would be felt by post-centrally planned economies-for decades to come. They are not only permanently crippled by system-specific distortions but the rehabilitation process – even after a change of system and strategy -would be exasperatingly long".

8. References

"A Discussion on the Decisions Adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic on March 10-12, 1990". 1990. Materials of the Special Third Congress of People's Deputies of the. USSR. Moscow.
Aganbegyan, A. 1988. The Economic Challenqe of Perestroika. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Aleskaitis, V. 1990. "Islaikytine, duodanti nauda^".Atgimimas, No. 12.
Aslund, A. 1989. Gorbachev's Struggle.for Economic Reform. London: Pinter Publishers.
Balezentis, A. 1990. "Ispekime ateiti". Zemes ukio specialistas, No. 21..
Becker, G.S. 1990. "Actually, Small-Fry Nations Can Do Just Fine". Business Week, October 1.
Bhagwati, J. Brechter, R. and Hatta, T. 1984. "The Paradoxes of Immiserizing Growth and Donor-Enriching 'Recipient-Immiserizing' Transfers: A Tale of Two Literatures". Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, No. 4.

8. Borisov, B. and Mikhailov, L. 1990. "Litva - na puti k propasti?" Ekonomika i zhizn, No. 14.

Brada, J. 1985. "Soviet Subsidization of Eastern Europe: The Primacy of Economics Over Politics?". Journal of Comparative Economics, March.

10. Buchan, D. 1991. "EC seeks gradual links with the Baltics". Financial Times, September 10.

Department of Foreign Economic Relations. 1991. Latvia: An Economic Profile for the Foreign Investor. Riga: The Government of Latvia.
Desai, P. 1985. "Is the Soviet Union Subsidizing Eastern Europe?". European Economic Review, 29.
Duda, V. 1990. NUO optimalaus sprendimo, i optimalia, gamyba. Kaunas: Lithuanian Research Institute for the Mechanization of Agriculture.
"Grossly Deceptive Product". 1990. The Economist, March 10.

15. Hammer, D.P. 1990. Why Do the Russians Complain?. Paper presented to the conference on "The 'National Question' in the Soviet Union", Waterloo-Laurier Centre for Soviet Studies, University of Waterloo, Canada, May 2-5, 1990.

16. Hanson, P. 1991a. Presentation on Baltic Foreign Economic Relations at the Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Miami, Florida, November 24, 1991.

17. Hanson, P. 1991b. "External Economic Relations of the Baltic States", in: Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 43. New York: United Nations.

Hinds, M. 1990. Issues in the Introduction of Market Forces in Eastern European Socialist Economies. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Hammer, D.P. 1990. Why.. Do the Russians Complain?. Paper presented to the conference on "The 'National Question' in the Soviet Union", Waterloo-Laurier Centre for 'Soviet Studies, University of Waterloo, Canada, May 2-5, 1990.
Holzman, F. 1987. The Economics of Soviet B1oc Trade and Finance. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
"How Will an Independent Lithuania's Economy Function?". 1990. The Lithuanian Review, March 2.
"How to Compete". 1990. Harvard Business Review, No. 4.
"If Gorbachev dares". 1985. The Economist, July 6.
Jones, A. and Moskoff W. 1989. Perestroika and the Economy: New
Thinking in Soviet Eco.nomics. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

25. Karlsson, M. and Van Arkadie, B. /eds./. 1991. Economic Survey of the Baltic States. Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

26. Kirichenko, V.N. 1990. "Vernut doverie statistike". Kommunist, No. 3.

Kornai, J. 1990. The Road to a Free Economy. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Kushnirsky, F. 1989. Growth and Inflation in the Soviet Economy. Boulder: Westview Press.
Laird, R. 1990. "The USSR's Food Crisis". The Christian Science Monitor, July 27.
Lipton, D. and Sachs, J. 1990. "Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland". Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1.
"Lithuania's 'Indebtedness' to USSR Refuted". 1990. FBIS-SOV-90-084, May 1.
Maciuika, B. 1955. Lithuania in. the Last Thirty Years. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, No. 18.
Maniusis, J. 1976. Soviet Lithuania: Achievements and Prospects. Vilnius: Mintis.
Marer, P. 1985. Dollar ..GNPs of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern. Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. 1990. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization". The American Economic Review, No. 3.
Mocilnikar, A.T. 1999. “The Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: A New Economy For a United Europe”, Paper presented at the 5^th Franco-German Forum, CEPII-ZEI, Paris, July 5-6.
On the "Lithuanian Problem" (White Book).1990. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency.
Parkola, A. 1980. "Changes in the Sectoral Employment Structure of the CMEA Countries in the Period 1950-1975 /In Comparison with Developed Capitalist Countries/". Jahrbuch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas, Band 9, 1 Halbband.
Samonis, V. 1990a. From Plan to Market in Eastern Europe: Some Lessons from Polish Big Bang. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto.
Samonis, V. 1990b. Economic Reform Initiatives in Lithuania: From Moscow to Vilnius and From Plan to Market. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto.

41. Samonis, V. 1991a. One Step Forward and Two Steps Back: The Impact of Sovietization on the Lithuanian Economy. Toronto: University of Toronto.

Samonis, V. 1991b. From Dependence to Interdependence: Transforming Baltic Foreign Economic Relations. Indianapolis: The Hudson Institute.
Samonis, V. 1992. State, Market and the Post-Communist Economic Transformation: A Macroanalytical Framework (Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Sciences).
Samonis, V. 1995. Transforming the Lithuanian Economy: From Moscow to Vilnius and From Plan to Market. Warsaw: The Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE).
Samonis, V. 1996. "Lithuania's Economic Transformation". Osteuropa-Wirtschaft (Munich: Suedost-Institut), No. 2.
Samonis, V. 1997a. "Lithuania's Economic System and Foreign Relations on the Eve of the XXI Century", paper presented at the Conference "Between Europe and Eurasia: Lithuania on the Eve of the XXI Century", Jurbarkas, Lithuania, June 26-29, 1997.

47. Samonis, V. 1997b. Lithuania’s Road to Europe: A Comparative Assessment”.. "Lithuanian Papers" (Hobart: University of Tasmania, Australia), 1997, No. 11.

Samonis, V. 1997c. The Blueprint for Lithuania's Future: Main Premises (Toronto: University of Toronto and Samonis Emerging Markets Institute, 1999).
Samonis, V. (Editor). 1998. Enterprise Restructuring and Foreign Investment in the Transforming East: The Impact of Privatization (New York: The Haworth Press Inc.)
Samonis, V. 1999. "Road Maps to Markets: Issues in the Theory of the Post-Communist Transformation", in: Paul G. Hare, Editor, Systemic Change in Post-Communist Economies (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd).
Samonis, V. 2000a. Transforming Business Models in the Global Digital Economy: The Impact of the Internet. Bonn and Toronto: The Center for European Integration Studies and SEMI Online.

52. Samonis, V. 2000b. “Lietuvos Reformu Desimtmetis: Keliai, Klystkeliai, Problemos, Perspektyvos”. Vilnius University: Ekonomika, No. 50.

Samonis, V. (Editor). Exit for Entry: Microrestructuring in Transition Economies (Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers), forthcoming.
Schroeder, G. 1987. '"U.S.S.R.: Toward the Service Economy at a Snail's Pace". In: Gorbachev's Economic Plans: Study Papers Submitted .to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Volume 2.

55. Schroeder, G. 1992. "On the Economic Viability of New Nation States". Journal of International Affairs, February.

Seliunin, V. and Khanin, G. 1987. "Lukavaia tsifra". Novyi Mir, No. 2.
Simutis, A. 1942. The Economic Reconstruction of Lithuania After 1918. New York: Columbia University Press.

58. Smulders, M. 1990. Who Owes Whom? Mutual Economic Accounts Between Latvia and the USSR 1940-1990. Riga: The Government of Latvia.

59. "Stabilization, liberalization and devolution: Assessment of the economic situation and reform process in the Soviet Union". 1990. European Economy, December.

Ten Years of Lithuanian Economy. 1938. Kaunas: Report of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Crafts.
Terleckas, V. 1990. "Lithuanian Economic Dependence: Fact or Fiction? The Lithuanian Review, February 15.
Uosis, S., Terleckas, V., Baldisis, V. 1989. Lietuvos pinigu ir kredito sistemos koncepcija. Vilnius: Zinija.
Vaisnoras, J. 1990. "Lietuvos aukso likimas". Varpas.
Vasiliauskas, A. 1990. Lietuvos ekonominio savarankiskumo pletojimo problemos". Varpas.
Winiecki, J. 1999. Historical output and trade distortions as determinants of export performance in post-communist transition. Torino: International Centre for Economic Research, Working Paper no. 25/99.

END OF PAPER.

Category : Featured black / Historical Lithuania

The Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact

- Posted by - 6845(2) CommentThe+Molotov+%E2%80%93++Ribbentrop+Pact2011-06-27+12%3A47%3A400df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D6845

Part 2 of 2:

THE DOCUMENTS

Dear readers,

While assembling the material for this article I found that continuously, instead of adhering to the task of organizing and formatting the text and the copies of the documents, I would be drawn to the translations of the documents. I would find myself over and over and over again reading the translations and as I did the emotions of disgust, repulsion and anger would begin to grow as I read the agreement between two powerful countries, led by two deranged mad men, presented in a contractual format as if they were documenting an agreement for the use of land which includes a right of way, which was in fact an agreement on the control of lands that were not theirs and the control of the free people that owned these lands and who’s land was their home.

While I understand nothing written in the cryptic alphabet of the Russian language and very little of written German, I would also find myself, for time on, end staring at the copies of the actual documents. Over and over I would look at these documents and realize that it was these very documents, that with a mere stroke of a pen that resulted in millions of innocent lives being lost and millions of more lives being changed forever.

Dear readers, we would be very interested to hear of your thoughts after reading these documents and their translations.

Su pagarbe
Vincas Karnila
Associate Editor

Note from Saulius Sužiedėlis: Some frames of the microfilm copies of the German-Soviet pacts housed in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. are not in the best condition. The German and Russian-language facsimiles of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939 and the Secret Supplementary Protocol presented here were published in Jan Szembek, Diariusz i teki (London: Polish Research Centre, 1972), iv, 752-760. The other texts are from the National Archives, T-120, Records of the German Foreign Office.

The German text of the Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the USSR, 23 August 1939, signed by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov.

The German text of the Supplementary Secret Protocol, 23 August 1939, signed by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov.

The Russian text of the Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Soviet Union, 23 August 1939, signed by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov.

The Russian text of the Supplementary Secret Protocol, 23 August 1939, signed by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov.

Source: Jan Szembek, Diariusz i Teki (London: Polish Research Centre, 1972), IV, 752-760 as provided by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library.

THE DOCUMENTS IN TRANSLATION:

TEXTS OF TREATIES AND CORRESPONDENCE 1939-1941

- Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secret Additional Protocol, 23 August 1939.

- Secret Additional Protocol of 28 September 1939 Amending the Secret Agreement of 23 August 1939.

- German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of 28 September 1939; Confidential Protocols Concerning Repatriation and Political Subjugation of Poland; Declaration of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR.

- German-Soviet Protocol of 10 January 1941 Concerning Transfer of the Rights to the Suwalki Strip to the USSR.

GERMAN CORRESPONDENCE ON THE PACT, OCTOBER 1939

- The German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, to the German Ambassador in Moscow, Schulenberg.

- The German Minister in Kaunas Informed of the Secret Protocol; Zechlin Reports on Lithuanian Reaction.

- Ribbentrop Tells German Envoys in the Baltic About the Secret Protocol.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The English-language translations of the German and Russian documents presented are taken from the following sources with only slight adaptations: Raymond Janes Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, ed. Nazi-Soviet Relations: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State, 1948), 76-78, 105-107; Paul R. Sweet et. al, ed., Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. (Washington: Dept. of State, 1949-1964), Series D, Vol. VIII (1954), 166; Vol. XI (1960), 1068. The three documents of October 1939 are from the German Foreign Office files, from Documents, Vol. VIII, 214-215, 238. These and other documents are conveniently assembled in Bronis J. Kasias, ed. The USSR-German Aggression Against Lithuania (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1973).

Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following agreement:

Article I

Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other either individually or jointly with other powers.

Article II

Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power.

Article III

The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

Article IV

Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

Article V

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.

Article VI

The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.

Article VII

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government
of the German Reich:

V. Ribbentrop

With full power of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov

Secret Additional Protocol

On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilnius area is recognized by each party.

2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in the areas.

4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government
of the German Reich:

V. Ribbentrop

With full power of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov

Secret Additional Protocol of 28 September 1939

The undersigned plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. upon the following:

The Secret Additional Protocol signed on August 23,1939, shall be amended in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of influence of the U.S.S.R., while, on the other hand, the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of Germany (cf. the map attached to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed today). As soon as the Government of the U.S.S.R. shall take special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of the line marked on the attached map falls to Germany.

Further it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above.

Moscow, September 28, 1939

For the Government
of the German Reich:

V. Ribbentrop

With full power of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov

German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. consider it exclusively their task, after the collapse of the former Polish state, to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national character. To this end, they have agreed upon the following:

Article I

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. determine as the boundary of the respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state the line marked on the attached map, which shall be described in more detail in a supplementary protocol.

Article II

Both parties recognize the boundary of the respective national interests established in Article 1 as definitive and shall reject any interference of third powers in this settlement.

Article III

The necessary reorganization of public administration will be effected in the areas west of the line specified in 1 by the Government of the German Reich, in the areas east of the line by the Government of the U.S.S.R.

Article IV

The Government of the German Reich and the Government the U.S.S.R. regard this settlement as a firm foundation for a progressive development of the friendly relations between their peoples.

Article V

This treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin as soon as possible. The treaty becomes effective upon signature.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, September 28, 1939

For the Government
of the German Reich:

V. Ribbentrop

With full power of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov

Confidential Protocol

The Government of the U.S.S.R. shall place no obstacles in the way of Reich nationals and other persons of German descent residing in the territories under its jurisdiction, if they desire to migrate to Germany or to the territories under German jurisdiction. It agrees that such removals shall be carried out by agents of the Government of the Reich in cooperation with the competent local authorities and that the property rights of the emigrants shall be protected.

A corresponding obligation is assumed by the Government of the German Reich in respect to the persons of Ukrainian or Belorussian descent residing in the territories under its jurisdiction.

Moscow, September 28, 1939

For the Government
of the German Reich:

V. Ribbentrop

With full power of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov

Secret Additional Protocol

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, on concluding the German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, have declared their agreement upon the following:

Both parties will tolerate no Polish agitation in their territories which affects the territories of the other party. They will suppress in their territories all beginnings of such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable measures for this purpose.

Moscow, September 28, 1939

For the Government
of the German Reich:

V. Ribbentrop

With full power of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov

German-Soviet Secret Protocol

The German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, Plenipotentiary of the Government of the German Reich, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., V.M. Molotov, Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, have agreed upon the following:

1. The Government of the German Reich renounces its claim to the strip of Lithuanian territory which is mentioned in the Secret Additional Protocol of September 28, 1939, and which has been marked on the map attached to this Protocol;

2. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to compensate the Government of the German Reich for the territory mentioned in Point 1 of this Protocol by paying 7,500,000 gold dollars or 31,500,000 million reichsmarks to Germany.

The amount of 31,5 million Reichsmarks will be paid by the Government of the U.S.S.R. in the following manner: one-eight, that is, 3,937,500 Reichsmarks, in nonferrous metal deliveries within three months after the signing of this Protocol, the remaining seven-eights, or 27,562,500 Reichsmarks in gold by deduction from the German gold payments which Germany is to make by February 11, 1941, in accordance with the correspondence exchanged between the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation, Dr. Schnurre, and the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., A.I. Mikoyan, in connection with the "Agreement of January 10,1941, concerning reciprocal deliveries in the second treaty period on the basis of the Economic Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of February 11, 1940."

3. This Protocol has been executed in two originals in the German language and two originals in the Russian language and shall become effective immediately upon signature.

Moscow, January 10, 1941.

For the Government
of the German Reich:

Schulenburg (Seal)

By authority of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov (Seal)

From the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, to the German Ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg

Very urgent

Strictly secret
No. 497 of October 4

Berlin, October 5, 1939—3:43 a.m.
Received Moscow, October 5, 1939—11:55 a.m.

Referring to today's telephonic communication from the Ambassador.

The Legation in Kaunas is being instructed as follows:

1) Solely for your personal information, I am apprising you of the following: At the time of the signing of the German-Russian Nonagression Pact on August 23, a strictly secret delimitation of the respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe was also undertaken. In accordance therewith, Lithuania was to belong to the German sphere of influence, while in the territory of the former Polish state, the so-called four-river line, Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San, was to constitute the border. Even then I demanded that the district of Vilnius go to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government consented. At the negotiations concerning the Boundary and Friendship Treaty on September 28, the settlement was amended to the extent that Lithuania, including the Vilnius area, was included in the Russian sphere of influence, for which in turn, in the Polish area, the province of Lublin and large portions of the province of Warsaw, including the pocket of territory of Suwalki, fell within the German sphere of influence. Since, by the inclusion of the Suwalki tract in the German sphere of influence a difficulty in drawing the border line resulted, we agreed that in case the Soviets should take special measures in Lithuania, a small strip of territory in the southwest of Lithuania, accurately marked on the map, should fall to Germany.

2) Today Count von der Schulenburg reports that Molotov, contrary to our own intentions, notified the Lithuanian Foreign Minister last night of the confidential arrangement. Please now, on your part, inform the Lithuanian Government, orally and in strict confidence, of the matter, as follows:

As early as at the signing of the German-Soviet Nonagression Pact of August 23, in order to avoid complications in Eastern Europe, conversations were held between ourselves and the Soviet Government concerning the delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of influence. In these conversations I had recommended restoring the Vilnius district to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government gave me its consent. In the negotiations concerning the Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, as is apparent from the German-Soviet boundary demarcation which is published, the pocket of territory of Suwalki jutting out between Germany and Lithuania had fallen to Germany. As this created an intricate and impractical boundary, I had reserved for Germany a border correction in this area, whereby a small strip of Lithuanian territory would fall to Germany. The award of Vilnius to Lithuania was maintained in these negotiations also. You are now authorized to make it known to the Lithuanian Government that the Reich Government does not consider the question of this border revision timely at this moment. We make the proviso, however, that the Lithuanian Government treat this matter as strictly confidential. End of instruction for Kaunas.

I request you to inform Mr. Molotov of our communication to the Lithuanian Government. Further, please request of him, as already indicated in the preceding telegram, that the border strip of Lithuanian territory involved be left free in the event of a possible posting of Soviet trrops in Lithuania and also that it be left to Germany to determine the date of the implementing of the agreement concerning the cession to Germany of the territory involved. Both of these points at issue should be set forth in a secret exchange of letters between yourself and Molotov.

Ribbentrop

From the German Minister in Kaunas, Zechlin, to the German Foreign Office

Most urgent
No. 175 of October 5
Kaunas, October 5, (1939)—7:55 p.m.
Received October 5—10:30 p.m.

With reference to telegram No. 252 of October 5 (4)

[Deputy Prime Minister Kazys] Bizauskas sent for me today even before I could ask for an appointment with the Foreign Minister as instructed in telegram No. 252; he first made excuses for Mr. Urbšys, who was completely occupied today with continuous discussions in the Cabinet and therefore unfortunately could not speak with me himself. He then informed me that Molotov had told Urbšys that Germany had laid claim to a strip of Lithuanian territory, the limits of which included the city and district of Naumiestis and continued on past the vicinity of Mariampolė. This had made a deep and painful impression on Lithuania, and Urbšys had flown back to Kaunas partly because of this information, which he had not wished to transmit by telephone.

The Lithuanian Government has instructed Škirpa to make inquiries in Berlin.

I told him that in the Moscow discussions on the delimitation of the German and Soviet spheres of interest, the Reich Foreign Minister had advocated giving the Vilnius area to Lithuania and had also obtained the Soviet Government's agreement in the matter. While Lithuania had the prospect of such a great increase in territory a difficult and impracticable boundary in the vicinity of the Suwalki tip had come into existence because of the German-Soviet border division. Therefore the idea of a small border rectification at the German-Lithuanian frontier had also emerged in the course of these negotiations; but I could inform him that the German Government did not consider the question pressing. Bizauskas received this information with visible relief and asked me to transmit the thanks of the Lithuanian Government on his score to the Reich Government. Furthermore he asked on his part that the matter be kept strictly secret, which I promised him.

I might add that since the fixing of the German-Soviet frontier became known, political quarters here have had great hopes of obtaining the Suwalki tip from Germany.

Zechlin

From the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, to the German Ministers in Tallinn, Riga and Helsinki

Most Urgent
(1) To Talinn, N. 257
(2) To Riga, No. 328
(3) To Helskin, No. 318

Berlin, October 7, 1939

Exclusively for the Minister personally.

Supplementing our telegrams No. 241 to (1), No. 303 to (2) and No. 305 to (3), I am communicating the following to you in strict secrecy and for your personal information only:

During the Moscow negotiations with the Soviet Government the question of delimiting the spheres of interest of both countries in Eastern Europe was discussed in strict confidence, not only with reference to the area of the former Polish state, but also with reference to the countries of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. At the same time the delimitation of the spheres of interest was agreed upon for the eventuality of a territorial and political reorganization in these areas. The borderline fixed for this purpose for the territory of the former Polish state is the line designated in article 1 of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28 and publicly announced. Otherwise, the line is identical with the German-Lithuanian frontier. Thus it follows that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland do not belong to the German sphere of interest in the sense indicated above.

You are requested to refrain, as heretofore, from any explanations on this subject.

The Foreign Minister

We would like to thank Lituanus for their kind permission to share this article with you.
LITUANUS
LITHUANIAN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Volume 35 - Spring 1989
Editor of this issue: Saulius Sužiedėlis
THE MOLOTOV - RIBBENTROP PACT: THE DOCUMENTS
http://www.lituanus.org

Category : Featured / Historical Lithuania

Back to the USSR!

- Posted by - 1891(6) CommentBack+to+the+USSR%212011-06-16+09%3A50%3A030df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D1891

BACK TO THE USSR!

Text: Vin Karnila

ZAZ-965A Zaporozhets, produced 1962-1969

When people talk about how life was and how society was during the Soviet times, it

is not a happy conversation filled with laughter. Yes, there is the laughter and warm conversations about family events during this time. There is also much laughter when talking about some of the absurdities of the Soviet system of government but in general, there is very little to generate smiles and good humor when you talk about how the Soviets imposed their will on the people. With one exception – their automobiles...

SO, HOWS YOUR ZHIGULI?

Text: Vin Karnila

This could have been a common question between friends, family and colleagues during the time of Soviet Russia’s occupation of Lithuania and the Baltics. When people talk about how life was and how society was during this time, it is not a happy conversation filled with laughter. Yes, there is the laughter and warm conversations about family events during this time. There is also much laughter when talking about some of the absurdities of the Soviet system of government but in general, there is very little to generate smiles and good humor when you talk about how the Soviets imposed their will on the people. With one exception – their automobiles.

As most of you know, buying an automobile during Soviet times was not a matter of months of visiting one dealership and another, looking at automotive magazines getting advice on what model to buy, asking friends and family what they think is the best model for you. You went to a government office and submitted a written request to buy a car. After a year or so you found out if your request was approved. If it was approved you were TOLD what car the government was ALLOWING you to buy (in some cases you were very lucky and were given two options) and then you submitted your order and waited another two or three years (possibly longer) to actually take delivery.

In spite of all this, when ever the conversation turns to cars, when ever you ask about the car a person had during these times or when ever you mention a car of the Soviet era the reaction is always the same. The response is always smiles, laughter and entertaining stories about their car and their automotive adventures. Because of this I thought it would be entertaining and interesting to look at some of these vehicles of Soviet times just to give you a bit of an idea as to what causes all this good natured reminiscing.

ZAPOROZHETS / ZAZ

The Zaporožietis or Zaporožkė, as the Lithuanians said it (Zaporozhets in Russian) was a series of subcompact cars designed and built from 1958 at the ZAZ factory in Soviet Ukraine ("Zaporizky Avtomobilny Zavod", or Zaporizhian Automobile Factory). Different types of Zaporozhets were produced until 1994.

In Russian, the name Zaporozhets means a Cossack of the Zaporizhian Sich. It can also mean а man from the Zaporizia Oblast.

Zaporozhets are still warmly remembered in the Baltics and many of the other ex Soviet Russian occupied countries. In fact I must say that if you just mention Zaporožietis, immediately you see big smiles and most often the smiles turn to laughter. The Soviet Zaporozhets was destined to become a "people's car", as it was the cheapest of Soviet cars and so it was affordable to the common workers. In fact the term “peoples car” is not quite accurate in today’s opinion. Most people today consider it the “worker’s car” in that this was the car that lower paid “workers” were allowed to buy. If your status and income was higher than the “common worker” you were allowed to buy a car a bit more desirable. In spite of its small stature it proved to be rather sturdy and well suited for the poor Soviet roads. All Zaporozhets were rear engine and rear wheel drive with an air cooled engine. The looks of this car resulted in several nicknames. One was "Zapor". This was just short for "Zaporozhets" but the problem was that the word “zapor” in Russian also means "constipation". Some called it the “Kuprius” (hunchback) due to the ZAZ-965’s rear shape. ZAZ factory workers supposedly never used these derogatory nicknames, using "Malysh" (in Russian this roughly translates to child) instead. Another translates to "big-eared" since the car had air intake scoops on its sides to cool down the engine in the rear of the vehicle.

ZAZ-965 Zaporozhets model was made between 1960 and 1963. Despite the fact that the design is almost identical to the Fiat 600 and Puch 500, ZAZ representatives say that the car was exclusively Soviet designed and created by Soviet ZAZ engineers jointly with colleagues from Moscow's NAMI and Moskvitch car plant. The first prototypes were actually designated as Moskvitch-444.

It was powered by a rear-mounted, air cooled OHV 887 cc V4 engine of partially aluminum design. Urban legend had it that the Zaporozhets engine was a starter motor in Soviet tanks. This is completely false. Any one that has knowledge of the Soviet tanks of that era will tell you this.

ZAZ-965A Zaporozhets

The “A” model was manufactured between 1962 and 1969. The most notable visible difference was that the ZAZ-965A had the air-intake "ears" removed. It also had a new engine which created more room in the engine compartment. Since Soviet car owners were expected to do much of the servicing themselves, this layout was more practical especially if you needed to work on the car in harsh winter conditions.

ZAZ-965A Zaporozhets

While there are not a lot of ZAZ-965s still driving on the roads of the Baltics, it is surprising how many you still see. As you see one driving down the road it’s interesting to see the reactions of the other drivers. Every one looks, they point, they smile and if there are others in the car you can see that they immediately start talking to each other. When you see one parked on the street you will almost always see a group of people around it, all with big smiles on their faces. They are talking and laughing about the ZAZ that they had or some one they knew had and reminiscing about all the adventures and long trips they took in it. Let’s face it, the 965 is cute as a button and it’s just not possible to not love the little thing.

ZAZ-966 Zaporozhets model was made from 1967 to 1974. It had a restyled body and no longer resembled the Fiat 600 BUT NOW very closely resembling the German NSU Prinz 4 which had been on the roads since 1961. Once again the Soviets said, NO NO NO it’s our design (why do they always do that). In addition to the “new style” body, the engines were slightly updated but the infamous "ears" were back.

ZAZ-968 Zaporozhets was produced from 1972 to 1980. While the outside was about the same as the 966 model. it featured the newer MeMZ-968 engine, which increased the displacement to 1.2L and the power output.

Vladimir Putin with his 1972 ZAZ-968 Zaporozhets

ZAZ-968M Zaporozhets once again had the ears removed and was made from 1979 to 1994. Special versions of this model Zaporozhets were equipped with additional sets of controls that allowed operating the car for driver’s without the use of one leg or with hand controls if they were without the use of both legs. These were given for free to the disabled people that the Soviets felt warranted the use of an automobile.

ZAZ-968M

You still see quite a few ZAZ-968s on the road here. They have proven themselves to be very durable cars over the years and are easy for the owners to repair and maintain themselves and with the higher quality of replacement parts available today they are also quite reliable. While one that has been preserved or restored and is in excellent condition may get a few closer looks they just don’t get the attention the original ZAZ-965s do.

ZHIGULI

Due to exporting and a number of manufacturing plants around the world producing these cars, this is the most internationally recognized car of the Soviet Union. What most of the world knows as the LADA was named the ZHIGULI in the Soviet Union. Actually the name of the first model was VAZ-2101 manufactured by VAZ (Volzhsky Avtomobilny Zavod – Volga Automobile Plant). This time there was no guessing as to the true origin of the design. The VAZ-2101 came about through collaboration with the Soviet Union, Italy and Fiat. The manufacturing plant’s construction was begun in 1966 on the banks of the Volga River in the Samara Oblast of Russia and the first cars left the production line in 1970. The first model produced was the VAZ-2101 sedan. In 1972 the first station wagon was produced the Vaz-2102. A new town, Tolyatti, named after the Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti, was built around the factory to accommodate all the workers.

VAZ-2101 Sedan

The origin of the VAZ-2101 comes from the Fiat 124 sedan so all were front engine, rear wheel drive with a straight rear axle. Many modifications were required though so that the car could survive being driven on the terrible roads in the Soviet Union and in extremely harsh winter weather. Some of these modifications were the suspension being strengthened and raised to clear rough Soviet roads and the body shell was made from thicker, heavier steel. The first models were equipped with a starting handle in case the battery went flat in Siberian winter conditions, though this was later dropped. Another feature specifically intended to help out in cold conditions was a manual auxiliary fuel pump. As with most automobile models, there were revisions over the years which resulted in the model numbers being changed to 2103,2105, 2106 and 2107. These revisions were mainly changes to the engine size and some cosmetic changes however they all kept the “boxy” shape and style of the Fiat 124. In the late 80s the ZHIGULI name went away, the company was restructured and became known as LADA. At this point the “boxy” Fiat 124 style went away and the company started producing more modern styled vehicles.

VAZ-2102 Wagon

The VAZ-2101 was also destined to become a “people’s car”. While more expensive than the ZAZ models it was still priced so that the “middle class” (if there ever was such a thing in the Soviet Union) could afford one.

Henry Ford said of his Model – T Ford vehicle:

"I will build a car for the great multitude. It will be large enough for the family, but small enough for the individual to run and care for. It will be constructed of the best materials, by the best men to be hired, after the simplest designs that modern engineering can devise. But it will be so low in price that no man making a good salary will be unable to own one—and enjoy with his family the blessing of hours of pleasure in God's great open spaces."

This was the intent of the Soviets with the ZHIGULI. It was said that based on the average wage of a worker, it would take about eight years for a person to save up the money to buy a one. The ZHIGULI quickly became a hit with the people and became the car of the Soviet Union. While the ZAZ was surprisingly roomy for a car its size the ZHIGULI was roomier and more comfortable. Keep in mind though that the ZHIGULI was a very basic vehicle and far from anything even remotely close to being luxurious. It also proved to be quite sturdy and reliable and owners could easily perform maintenance and do repairs. Not only was the ZHIGULI the most popular car in the private sector it was also the car most used as taxis and by city, regional and federal governments. They even had special Police models.

ZHIGULI - Police

Now let’s try to clear up the confusion about the name. As I stated before, the actual name of the car is VAZ. The various models are VAZ-2101, VAZ-2102, etc. If a VAZ-2101 was destined for the Soviet Union it would be called a ZHIGULI or more specific ZHIGULI-2101. If the car was destined for outside the Soviet Union it would be called a LADA or more specifically LADA-1200. LADAs were exported not only to the Soviet Block countries but to countries all over the world. In fact there were so many LADAs built in Russia and in other countries that it remains the MOST PRODUCED CAR IN THE WORLD. Yes you got that right – more than any Ford, GM, Toyota, etc. model.

Now here’s the next question. How do you tell a ZHIGULI from a LADA?

1. If the steering wheel is on the right side it was made for export – It’s a LADA

2. If it has a diesel engine it was made for export – It’s a LADA (there were no diesel ZHIGULIs and no LADAs in the Soviet Union were diesel powered)

So if the steering wheel is on the left and it has a gasoline powered engine the only way to tell is to look at the rear of the car.

Example – Hear is a VAZ-2102 wagon I photographed in Vilnius last week.

Is it a ZHIGULI or a LADA?

VAZ2102

If you look at the logo on the front this won’t tell you anything because this is the logo for the VAZ company and will be found on both cars.

VAZ2102-FrontLADA logo

When you look at the back you can see that ZHIGULI is written in Russian. If it was a LADA, the word LADA would be written in the Latin alphabet. From this you can also tell that this wagon is the

VAZ-21021/ZHIGULI-21021 model because it shows that it has a 1300 cc engine. Based on this you would also know that it was manufactured sometime between 1978 - 1986. If it had a 1200 cc engine it would be a VAZ-2102/ZHIGULI-2102 manufactured sometime between 1972 – 1983.

Other than the name on the car, there were no other differences between a ZHIGULI and a LADA.

VAZ2102-Back

Now a moment ago I said that there were no LADAs in the Soviet Union that were diesel powered. I also said that the cars with the LADA name plate on them were for export. So what’s with the LADAs in the Soviet Union???

Actually, there where many LADAs on the roads of the Soviet Union. What happened was this. At the factory they would put the LADA name plate on a car as it was destined for export. Then they decided that the vehicle was more needed in the home market so they would send it to some where in the Soviet Union instead of exporting it. Another situation was a car with the LADA name tag would be exported. It would be sitting in a Soviet block country waiting delivery to some one then it was decided that it was needed in the home market and it would be sent back to the Soviet Union. This is how so many LADAs ended up being on Soviet Union roads.

My cousin Vytautas in Vilnius had one of these. He got it around 1980 (as he recalls he paid 6,000 Rubles for it) and drove it until about 1995. Even though the name on the car said LADA, never while he drove it and never after he got rid of it did he ever and has never referred to it as a LADA – ALWAYS it is ZHIGULI!!! I can’t speak for our good friends in Estonia and Latvia but I can tell you that in Lithuania the VAZ-2100 series was and still is ALWAYS called ZHIGULI never LADA.

Where did these names Zhiguli and Lada come from?

ZHIGULI came from the Zhiguli Mountains which are located in the area of the confluence of the Volga and Samara Rivers in Russia. LADA is a little more difficult to pinpoint. It is widely believed that the LADA was named after some ones daughter, wife or grandmother in the shortened version of the female Slavic name of Ladislava. Another theory is that it is the shortened version Ladislava who in Slavic mythology is the goddess of beauty, love and marriage. Dear readers, if you can shed any light on this question of the LADA name please tell us.

As I have mentioned a number of times the ZHIGULI was quite a reliable car. This statement may draw some reactions from some of our readers in countries where the LADA was exported to or produced. In many of these countries the LADA’s reputation was just the opposite. One of the countries LADA was exported to was Canada and I’m sure many of our Canadian friends could describe the car in most uncomplimentary terms. In fact I can recall some of the LADA jokes I would hear while visiting clients, friends and family in Canada.

Q: How do you double the resale value of a Lada?

A: Fill 'er up!

Q: Why do Ladas come as standard equipment with rear window defrosters?

A: So your hands stay warm while you're pushing it.

Jokes aside, here was the situation. The internally lubricated parts of the motor were of amazingly (or even surprisingly) high quality. It was very common that an owner would put over 400,000 kilometers on the engine before a major overhaul was needed. One of my students told me that his father had over 600,000 kilometers on his ZHUGILI before he needed a new motor. The problem was all the other components like fuel and water pumps, ignition system, generator, etc. These parts suffered from quality issues. To compound the matter, in many countries there were also issues with parts availability. So a LADA owner would have a problem with the car. They would take the car to the LADA dealership to find out that they would need to wait a number of days or even weeks for the part to fix it. Now a minor inconvenience turns into a major problem. The other problem was that often the replacement part would have the same quality issues as the original part and sometime in the future the owner would suffer a repeat of the same situation. As I understand it, these days the replacement parts for the ZHIGULI are of very good quality. As a result I have been told that a ZHIGULI/LADA still on the road today is actually a better car than when it was new if it has had many of these new higher quality replacement parts installed on the car.

VOLGA / GAZ

Unlike the smiles and laughter you get when you ask somebody about their Zaporožietis or ZHUGILI, when you mention VOLGA you get a serious look and an answer like – Oh, those were only for important people. I guess if you had a Volga you would be all smiles and giggles but the point is that not many people were allowed to drive a Volga.

The Volga was an automobile that the Soviets produced to replace the outdated GAZ-M20 Pobeda in 1956. Extremely modern in design for its time, it became a symbol of higher status in the Soviet elite. In addition to their role as status symbol, many were also used as taxi cabs, road police interceptors, and ambulances (estate/wagon models).

Manufactured by GAZ or Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod (Gorkey Automobile Factory), three models series of the Volga were produced during the time of Soviet Russia’s occupation of the Baltics. The GAZ-21, GAZ-24 and GAZ-24-10.

The GAZ-21 Volga was produced in three series from 1956 to 1970. It was offered in a sedan and estate/wagon (GAZ-22). While designed by Lev Yeremeev it still copied automotive designs of western countries (so what else is new). The Volga was everything that the ZHUGILI was not. It was very well styled and comfortable for it’s time. With a 2.4 Liter engine it had some get-up-and-go.

GAZ-21 1^st Series GAZ-21 2^nd Series GAZ-21 3^rd Series

GAZ-24 Volga

The GAZ-24 Volga was produced in two series. First series 1968 to 1977 and the second series from 1968 to 1985. It was produced in a sedan and an estate/wagon model and was powered by a 2.4 Liter engine. In addition to wanting to offer a more modern style body, the reason for the GAZ-24 was to correct design faults in the GAZ-21. Among the improvements were changes to the leaf spring suspension, new ignition and boot locks. One unique feature that the early series featured was a belt driven speedometer, which proved too complicated and was replaced with a cable drive. In 1977 the car saw the first serious modernization, this introduced "teeth" on the bumpers, retractable seat belts, front fog lights and new dashboard. The interior of the car saw the front bench seat replaced by two individual adjustable seats.

GAZ-24 Volga GAZ-24 Volga – side view GAZ-24 Volga – Police

The GAZ-24-01 Volga was introduced in 1971 was built to serve as a taxi. Changes included an artificial leather interior as well as slightly modified engine as well as the usual taxi equipment.

GAZ-24-01 Taxi

The GAZ-24-02 Volga was the estate/wagon version and it was introduced in 1972. The production of this model lasted right up to 1987. An ambulance version, the GAZ-24-03 was built on the estate's version.

GAZ-24-02 Estate GAZ-24-03 Ambulance

There was actually a third series the GAZ-24-24 Volga which was powered by a 5.53 litre, 195 hp V8 engine. This car was never available for private ownership and was used by the KGB.

GAZ-24-24 – KGB

The GAZ-24-10 Volga was the third model. This model had, in addition to cosmetic and styling changes, quite a lot technical upgrades to the power train, braking system, suspension and carburetor and cooling mechanism. Its production began in 1982 with a sedan model and in 1987 they began producing a wagon model. Even with all these upgrades, the model was way behind in regards to styling and technology compared to western vehicles and production stopped in 1992.

GAZ-24-10

As I stated before, the Volga was not a “peoples” car. It was a car that the Soviets only gave the “elite” permission to own. There are surprisingly still quite a few being driven on the roads of the Baltics and it is very interesting to see the reaction of people when they see a Volga these days. For the most part the reaction is – so what. If one is parked on the street it may, at the most, receive a quick cursory glance. Only if the car has been maintained or restored to pristine condition will it get any real attention and then the attention is more to condition of the car. The reaction is not big smiles and laughter reminiscing about good times they and their family in the family car. It is more like many are thinking – Oh, so this is the car THEY said I could not have.

While I have shared some information on the more common cars that the people of the Baltics were “allowed” to drive during Soviet Times I think I should also point out some of the other vehicles that were on the roads of the Baltics during this period.

MOSKVITCH

The Moskvitch 400 series is another smiles and giggles car produced from 1956 to 1965. Since it was never produced in numbers like the Zaporožietis and ZHIGULI it did not achieve the “people’s car” status but still it was designed to be affordable for the average person. I honestly do not know any one that owned a Moskvitch but I know that whenever you talk about the car or when people see one the response is always light hearted. This is quite understandable. I mean just look at it. It’s a cute little thing and you can’t help but fall in love with it. It’s kind of like the reaction westerners have when you mention Morris Minor.

Moskvich 407 Moskvich Estate 423 Moskvich 408

According to my research, there was never an automobile manufacturing plant in the Baltics during the time of the Soviet occupation. In Latvia and in Lithuania though there were factories producing busses and trucks.

LATVIJA

The Riga Autobus Factory (RAF), (Rīgas Autobusu Fabrika in Latvian) was a factory Latvia, making vans and minibuses under the brand name Latvija. The factory first opened in Riga in 1949 then in 1976 the construction of the new factory in Jelgava was completed. Their vans and minibuses were widely used throughout the USSR as circuit taxis (the Marshrutkas), ambulances and as a special services vehicles. These were not intended for private use. In fact the only time an private individual would get permission to have one of these was if they had more than five children.

Since the vehicle itself was referred to as a “Latvija”, this vehicle brought about a new expression to the Lithuanian language. For example, say you were standing on the sidewalk waiting for a circuit taxi and a friend passing by stopped to talk with you. Your friend could ask “what are you doing” and your response would be “aš laukiu Latvijos” which translates to – I wait Latvija. Or you and spouse are talking about the birthday celebration you will be attending tomorrow and the question comes up of how will we get there. The answer would be “mes važiuosime su Latvija” which roughly translates to - we will take the Latvija.

Latvija-977 Latvija-2203

UAZ Bus

I just needed to throw this in. Made by UAZ, Ulyanovsk Automobile Factory (Ulyanovsky Avtomobilny Zavod in Russian), you still see a surprising number of these. Where you most often see them is at the open air fruit and vegetable markets that are so common here. Obviously from looking at the photo you can see that these were made for military and service use but since they are practically indestructible people have found that they are great for hauling produce from the villages to the city.

UAZ Bus

These next two vehicles must be mentioned when talking about cars of the Soviet era. Not because they were popular because they were not. They were not for sale. They were only allotted to the absolute upper echelon of the Soviet government. These two cars were the symbol of absolute Soviet power. They were also the symbol of the contradiction of the Soviet’s form of communism. In a form of government that was supposedly for the people and for the workers, the common people were only allowed to drive Zaporozhets and ZHIGULIs while the leaders of this government of the people rode around in ultimate luxury.

CHAIKA

The Chaika, which means gull, is a luxury automobile from the Soviet Union made by GAZ.

Chaikas were one step down from the more prestigious ZIL limousines, and were issued to top professionals, party officials, scientists, academics, and other VIPs. For their larger size and more powerful V8 engines, Chaikas were also ordered in some quantity by the KGB. Nikita Khrushchev, although entitled to a ZIL, was known to prefer Chaikas, and kept one at his summer dacha. If you notice the front grills of the cars they display a very distinct emblem which represents the wings of a gull.

GAZ – Chaika convertible GAZ-Chaika limo GAZ-Chaika

ZIL

ZIL (Zavod Imeni Lihacheva - Lihachev Industrial Plant ) built the cars that where the ultimate symbols of Soviet power, used to transport high level politburo members. The ZiL limousine was the favored mode of transport for a succession of leaders. Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev all had one. After communism collapsed, however, Boris Yeltsin got himself a Mercedes. It is reported though that President Medvedev now wants to replace his Mercedes with a Russian produced limo.

Joseph Stalin’s ZIL limo

The version probably most recognizable is the ZIL-115 which is an armor-platted limousine, produced in the early 1970s. It was used by the top members of the Politburo, Soviet dignitaries on foreign visits and army officers, but it was also used for weddings, which was the only opportunity for civilians to use them. It was very well armored to protect the occupants from small arms fire and the floor was also bomb and booby-trap proof . The interior of the car was quite well made and very well suited to heads of state.

ZIL-115 limo ZIL limo convertible

So dear readers, these are the vehicles that generate the light hearted responses from so many people here in the Baltics. Maybe there are some other models that you could add to this list? Perhaps you have some stories or “adventures” you could share with us about these automobiles? The information I have shared with you, I must admit, just scratches the surface of what the personal transportation situation was like during these times so we would very much like to hear from you to give all our readers around the world more insight to the cars of the Soviet time.

Su pagarbe

Vin Karnila

Associate Editor

Category : Blog archive / Featured black / Historical Lithuania

Gruto Parkas named the 4th most bizarre museum in Europe

- Posted by - 1308(0) Comment2011-06-16+09%3A47%3A450df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D1308

From 1952 till 1991 a statue of Lenin occupied one of the most prominent places in Vilnius centre. Today you can still see this and many other sculptures and artifacts from Lithuania's years under the Soviet Union in Grutas Park near Druskinkai in southern Lithuania.

Lonely planet, one of the world’s most popular travel guide publishers, announced recently the list of the most bizarre museums in the world, and Grutas Park near Druskninkai in southern Lithuania was listed as the 4th most bizarre!

The park is dedicated to remind the visitors about the Soviet occupation period in Lithuania.

The park, sometimes called The World of Stalin, won the publishers admiration by black humour and irony from this otherwise sad period.

Gruto Parkas, established in 2001, was appreciated over The Museum of Bad Art in the US, the Hair Museum in Turkey, the International Towing and Recovery Museum in the US, the British Lawnmower Museum, the Sulabh Museum of Toilets and the Museum of Crutches in Azerbaijan.

However, Gruto Parkas was overridden by the Paris Sewer Museum, The Meguro Parasite Museum in Japan and the Icelandic Phallological Museum.

Also, last spring Lonely Planet declared the Curonian Spit of Lithuania’s seaside as the single calmest and most hammock-friendly European beach. In this global beach rating, the Curonian Spit won the 2nd place, overridden only by Dahab beach in Egypt. The Curonian Spit is also listed in the top 10 of the best beaches in Europe.

Lonely Planet declares the Curonian Spit (Neringa) of Lithuania’s seaside as the single calmest and most hammock-friendly European beach. The Curonian Spit is also listed in the top 10 of the best beaches in Europe.

Category : Historical Lithuania

Russian Rouble – invented in Lithuania?

- Posted by - 1902(2) Comment2011-06-16+08%3A16%3A540df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D1902

What would you think if you found out that experts believe that the Rouble did not

originate in Russia? What would you think if you found out that these same experts

believe the Rouble originated in Lithuania and then later migrated to Russia?

This article was partially based on an article written by Dr. A. M. Rackus
which was graciously sent to us by Mr. Arturas Bakanauskas

Was the Russian Rouble invented in Lithuania?

Text: Vin Karnila, Associate Editor

Lithuanian Rouble bar - grivna

When you hear the word “Rouble” automatically one thinks of Russia as this has been their official monetary unit for hundreds of years. During the many years of Imperial Russia it was called the Russian Rouble, during the times of Soviet Russia it was called the Soviet Rouble and now in the time of the Russian Federation it is again called the Russian Rouble. What would you think though if you found out that experts believe that the Rouble did not originate in Russia? What would you think if you found out that these same experts believe the Rouble originated in Lithuania and then later migrated to Russia?

To help sort this out, there are two things to keep in mind.

1. The history of the Rouble has been traced back to about 1000 years ago in Lithuania.

2. The earliest circular coin bearing the inscription "rouble" on it was struck by Czar Alexiei Mikhailovitch in 1654.

Prior to 1654 roubles were quite primitive. They were cast as silver bars in sand moulds. Once cast these bars were then cut into two equal parts. The shape of these bars are referred to as a boat and a finger with the oldest-type roubles being boat shaped and the later ones finger shaped.

It is believed that the origin of the word Rouble comes from the (old) Lithuanian word “kapa” which is a derivative of the (old) Lithuanian verb “kapat” which meant to cut or chop. The word "rouble" is derived from the White Russian / Ruthenian verb "rublit", which also means "to chop." Hence both terms, kapa and rouble, literally mean "a cut piece of silver."

To add further validity to not only the origin of the Rouble but to also help explain why these pieces of cut silver were in such abundance in this area, experts refer to the fact that during the medieval ages in Lithuania any individual had the right to cast silver into bars of a specific regulated weight and purity. There was an unwritten law, however, that smelters were under obligation to refine silver before it was cast into kapas / roubles and those that were caught cheating were put to death. There is also a record in the Livonian Statute of A. D. 1228, where it is stated that the death penalty will be imposed on those attempting to debase silver by adding to it even 1/16 part of other base metals. This is the reason why silver bar kapas /roubles, whenever found in Baltic States, are always nearly pure.

How early did kapas or roubles appear in Lithuania? Some experts believe they originated sometime between the ninth and tenth centuries. Their opinion is based on the following facts.

No gold or silver mine was ever found in Lithuania. Neither did Northern Russia have any silver mines in olden days. In spite of this, it is surprising the incredible amount of silver that circulated in Lithuania in the ninth century. Various archeological finds in Lithuanian territory prove it. At the beginning of the ninth century, Arabian merchants frequented Lithuania to purchase fine furs, beeswax and precious amber.

Brisk trading between Arabians and Lithuanians went on for about two hundred years. Arabians brought to Lithuania millions of their Cufic silver coins and silver ornaments. There was great excitement among archaeologists in 1909 when labourers, digging ditches at Gnezdovo / Gnyozdovo, near Smolensk, accidentally discovered a large treasure trove, which consisted of Arabian silver rings and Cufic coins. In regards to the findings at Gnezdovo, please remember that this area was a part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Several other similar large findings were dug up in various parts of what is now the Republic of Lithuania, where Cufic coins and silver bar roubles were found together; but in each find the quantity of Cufi coins was very small. This would indicate that as soon as a sufficient quantity of silver coins were gathered together they were melted and cast into bars, which were then ready at any time to be cut into kapa or rouble pieces. It is a well-known fact to historians and archaeologists that in A. D. 1012 the Arabian trade with Europe abruptly ceased and no more Cufic coins streamed into Europe. These facts also support the belief that kapas / roubles already existed in Lithuania between the 9th and 10th centuries.

While there is much documentation and findings regarding the kappa / rouble in Lithuania, Old Russian chronicles give very little information about roubles. The earliest date mentioning rouble in Russian chronicles is 1317. Excavations in the northern part of Russia also throw very little light on this subject. During the period of Tartaric invasion of Russia (1230-1400) the “Golden Horde” exacted enormous quantities of silver from the Russian people. Russian chronicles state that when Kiev was threatened by the Tartars in 1399, Kiev citizens had to pay to Khan Timur Kutluk a contribution of 3000 Lithuanian roubles. This proves that Lithuanian silver bar kapas / roubles circulated freely in Kiev long before 1399.

In the Russian province of Novgorod, marten skins were used as money up to 1410. Russian chronicles say that in 1410 Novgorod adopted Lithuanian money as legal tender, and the use of marten skins as money was discontinued. Evidently there was an abundance of Lithuanian money in Novgorod long before 1410, and in the market Lithuanian money had a strong purchasing power or Russians would have never adopted a foreign currency for their legal tender. In the Duchy of Pskov and other Russian localities, Lithuanian roubles were circulating freely as early as the beginning of the thirteenth century.

What is considered as one of the most interesting specimens, which created a sensation among Lithuanian numismatists recently, is a silver bar rouble with five different counter stamps on it. The purpose of counter stamping Lithuanian kapas / roubles by Russian dukes was either to legalize their circulation in Russian provinces or to claim their ownership and to record the name of the reigning duke. Numismatists know that most counter stamped coins, whether ancient or medieval, as a rule originally were issued in a foreign country. The same rule applies to Lithuanian kapas / roubles with Russian counter stamps on them. Another interesting fact is that whenever silver bar Kapa / rouble hoards are excavated in Lithuanian territory they are never found counter stamped. Only two instances are recorded where a few bar roubles were found with counter stamps in the Baltic States. In Russian territory, however, most bar-shaped roubles are found counter stamped. These facts would indicate that ruble originated in Lithuania and then migrated into Russia, where it was adopted later as a national Russian monetary unit and then evolved into official Rouble coins then into the official Rouble banknotes.

So here we have in the 9th and 10th centuries Lithuanians melting down Arabic silver coins into silver bars and calling these bars kapas / roubles. In 1399 we have the citizens of Kiev paying off Khan Timur Kutluk a contribution of 3000 LITHUANIAN roubles so that he would agree to not pillage and plunder their fair city. We also have Russian chronicles stating that in 1410 Novgorod adopted LITHUANIAN money as legal tender.

Then – We have documentation of the earliest circular coin bearing the inscription "rouble" on it in Russia was struck by Czar Alexiei Mikhailovitch in 1654.

So dear readers, what is YOUR conclusion?

Lithuanian Rouble or Russian rouble?

Su pagarbe

Vin Karnila

Associate editor

The earliest circular coin bearing the inscription "rouble" on it in Russia was struck by

Czar Alexiei Mikhailovitch in 1654.

Category : Blog archive / Historical Lithuania

- Posted by - 6539(7) Comment2011-06-11+14%3A46%3A000df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D6539

Cover of the book by Dr. Alfonsas Eidintas, “President of Lithuania: Prisoner of the gulag (A biography of Alexander Stulginskis).”

Aleksandras Stulginskis, the first constitutional president after Lithuania had declared its renewed independence on 16 February 1918, was kidnapped at his home by Stalinist forces in June 1941 and deported to a Siberian Gulag. After he was released from the inhuman captivity, he was still for years forced to live in Siberia’s deep forests, until 1956.

Lithuania’s President Aleksandras Stulginskis built this Siberian log cabin by his
own hands, living here with his wife Ona until 1956.

How could it be that a former head of state of a free and independent country could be kidnapped in his own home and taken around half the globe to imprisonment in a labour camp where cruelty and inhumanity were the principal characteristics?

How could it be that the rest of the world chose to ignore such an assault against a splendid leader who proudly had been fighting for democracy and independence in a nation that before the Second World War was fully on par with its neighbours in Scandinavia and Northern Europe, both economically and as an independent state?

Just think of what would have been the reactions from the international community if one of the other state leaders from the 1920s had become victims of such a cruel abuse?

I have below listed some of the state leaders who ruled at the time of President Stulginskis, many of them surely also knew him personally. Why didn’t his many 'friends' among leaders of all those nations around the world react and protest?

One can perhaps understand that the war made it difficult to stand up and condemn the atrocities that happened in Stalin's mighty Soviet Union, but why were there no reactions after the war?

In my opinion, President Stulginskis’ sad fate as a prisoner in Siberia through 15 long years, until 1956, is still too little known, and I think it’s high time we start spreading the story of Stulginskis throughout the world. Then his sufferings would not have been in vain, after all!

The same applies for the 13 years he lived after he had come back to Lithuania, a period when the once proud president was subjected to increasingly humiliating abuse from the Lithuanian SSR.

It must have been quite a shock to Stulginskis to return to Lithuania in 1956. The country he loved and had given everything for, was now ruled by Moscow-believing Communists. Hundreds of thousands of the country's leading women and men had fled to America and other nations in the west. Still others had been deported to Siberia, with tens of thousands dyeing en route to or on the permafrost. 1956 was the year that Lithuania's long-term guerrilla war against the Soviet superior force had finally come to an end, with the result that 20,000 Lithuanian forest brothers and about 70,000 Soviet soldiers had lost their lives. Lithuania in the period 1956-1969 was characterized by extensive KGB activity, denunciation, imprisonment and executions without trial, widespread corruption and mismanagement in which most of the good, democratic principles Stulginskis had fought so hard for were totally forgotten and disregarded.

LITHUANIAN SSR

Stulginskis passed away in Kaunas in 1969, after having experienced nearly 30 years of humiliating and unjust assaults in Siberia and in his once proud homeland Lithuania.

It is today 92 years since Stulginskis, together with the other brave leaders of those days, became one of the signatories of Lithuania's declaration of independence. And in only 10 days it is exactly 125 years since this political lion was born (26 February 1885).

President Aleksandras Stulginskis should not be forgotten.

Aage Myhre
Editor

WORLD LEADERS REIGNING AT THE TIME WHEN

STULGINSKIS WAS PRESIDENT OF LITHUANIA

- President Woodrow Wilson (United States)

- Vladimir Lenin (Russia, later Soviet Union)

- President Paul von Hindenburg (Germany)

- Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (United Kingdom)

- President Gaston Doumergue (France)

- Prime Minister Benito Mussolini (Italy)

- Prime Minister Józef Piłsudski (Poland)

- President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (Czechoslovakia)

- Prime Minister Charles Ruijs de Beerenbrouck

(The Netherlands)

- President Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg (Finland)

- Prime Minister Hjalmar Branting (Sweden)

- Prime Minister Johan Ludwig Mowinckel (Norway)

- Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning (Denmark)

President
ALEKSANDRAS STULGINSKIS
(1885-1969)

In May of 1920 Stulginskis was elected Chairman of the Constituent Seimas and
President of the State, reelected President at the First and the Second Seimas,
holding post of the President uninterruptedly until 7 June 1926.

Aleksandras Stulginskis was born in the village of Kutaliai of the Kaltinenai Rural District of the then Taurage District on 26 February 1885 into the family of a land tenant. He studied at the elementary school in Kaltinenai, the Liepaja gymnasium, and the Samogitian Theological Seminary in Kaunas. After graduating from the latter, he continued his studies in philosophy and theology at the University of Innsbruck (Austria). But upon making a decision not to be ordained as a priest, he entered the agronomy institute in Halle (Germany), and after graduating from it in 1913 started to work in Lithuania as an agronomist. He wrote many articles for the then Lithuanian press, mostly on the problems of the development of agriculture; from 1914 he edited the Viensedis (The Isolated Farm) periodical publication. When the Germans occupied Lithuania, he left for Vilnius and here joined the activity of Lithuanian organizations, and was elected to the Lithuanian Relief Committee, where he organized education courses for elementary school teachers. For quite a lengthy period headed the Rytas (Morning) Education Society, managed gardens in a Vilnius suburb that supplied orphanages with vegetables and potatoes. In 1918 he started publishing the newspaper Ukininkas (The Farmer), Ukininko kalendorius (The Farmer's Calendar).

In memory of the 40 years since Stulginskis’ passing away, 2009.

Stulginskis was one of the founders of the Christian Democratic Party. In 1917 he was elected Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party. In 1917 together with other Lithuanian patriots he appealed with a memorandum to the President of the United States W. Wilson for the recognition of Lithuania's independence. He was one of the organizers of the Lithuanian conference of Vilnius, a participant In it, and was elected to the Council of Lithuania(later the State Council). On 16 February 1918 he signed the Independence Act. With the war nearing the end and with Lithuanian refugees returning from Russia, Stulginskis headed the state commission for their affairs. Stulginskis spoke for an independent, democratic Lithuania and criticized severely those who agreed for Lithuania to become a monarchic state.

Stulginskis organized the defence of Lithuania against the Bolshevists and Poles, and founded a Lithuanian army. In M. Slezevicius' government he served as a minister without a portfolio. In P. Dovydaitis' cabinet of ministers A. Stulginskis served as a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Internal Affairs, afterwards Minister of Agriculture and State Wealth, and was one of the incorporators of the Ukio (Economic) Bank.

In May of 1920 he was elected Chairman of the Constituent Seimas and President of the State, reelected President at the First (21 December 1922) and the Second (19 June 1923) Seimas, holding post of the President uninterruptedly until 7 June 1926, when Dr. Kazys Grinius was elected President. In 1925-1930 Stulginskis was in charge of the Lithuanian Scout Brotherhood.

Lithuania’s Presidential Palace in Kaunas (1920 – 1940)

When the Bolsheviks occupied Vilnius in January 1919, the Government and ministries were moved to Kaunas. It was in the provisional capital that the State Council established the President's institution on 4 April 1919, and elected Antanas Smetona the first President of Lithuania. On 1 September 1919, President Smetona and his office moved to a building specially designated as the Presidential Palace, currently the Historical Presidential Palace in Kaunas.

It was here President Stulginskis held office from 1922 till 1926.

After the coup d'etat of 17 December 1926, Stulginskis was elected Chairman of the Fourth Seimas and held this post until 12 April 1927 when A. Smetona dissolved the Seimas. Then Stulginskis bought an estate in Jokubavas, in the Kretinga Rural District, and started to run it. At his leisure he wrote articles to the XX amzius (The 20th Century), Ukininkas and other periodical publications.

In 1938 he took part in the first World Lithuanian Congress in Kaunas, where he delivered a speech demanding the observance of the democratic principles in Lithuania.

The first year of the Soviet occupation he spent at his estate in Jokubavas. In June, 1941 he and his wife were arrested (their daughter Aldona evaded the arrest). The former President was deported to the camps in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, and his wife was exiled to the Komi Republic. Only in 1952, in the camp, Stulginskis' case was completed – and he was sentenced to the 25 years in Soviet camps. But after Stalin's death, due to Stulginskis' daring attempts he and his wife were allowed to return to Lithuania at the end of 1956. They resided in Kaunas.

Lithuania’s highly respected pre-war president and democracy builder, Aleksandras Stulginskis passed away on 22 September 1969. He was buried in the Aukstoji Panemune cemetery In Kaunas.

Grave of President Aleksandras Stulginskis and his wife Ona (Kaunas).

16 February – Lithuania’s Independence Day
16 February 1918 was the date Lithuania declared its independence from
Imperial Russia and established its statehood

File:Signatarai.Signatories of Lithuania.jpg

Members of the Council of Lithuania in 1917

From left to right

Sitting: J. Vileišis, dr. J. Šaulys, kun. J. Staugaitis, St. Narutavičius, dr. J. Basanavičius,
A. Smetona, kan. K. Šaulys, Stp. Kairys, J. Smilgevičius.

Standing: K. Bizauskas, J. Vailokaitis, Donatas Malinauskas, kun. Vl. Mironas, M. Biržiška,
kun. A. Petrulis, S. Banaitis, P. Klimas, A. Stulginskis, J. Šernas, Pr. Dovydaitis.

The Act of Independence of Lithuania (Lithuanian: Lietuvos Nepriklausomybės Aktas) or Act of February 16 was signed by theCouncil of Lithuania on February 16, 1918, proclaiming the restoration of an independent State of Lithuania, governed by democraticprinciples, with Vilnius as its capital. The Act was signed by all twenty representatives, chaired by Jonas Basanavičius. The Act of February 16 was the end result of a series of resolutions on the issue, including one issued by the Vilnius Conference and the Act of January 8. The path to the Act was long and complex because the German Empire exerted pressure on the Council to form an alliance. The Council had to carefully maneuver between the Germans, whose troops were present in Lithuania, and the demands of the Lithuanian people.

The immediate effects of the announcement of Lithuania's re-establishment of independence were limited. Publication of the Act was prohibited by the German authorities, and the text was distributed and printed illegally. The work of the Council was hindered, and Germans remained in control over Lithuania. The situation changed only when Germany lost World War I in the fall of 1918. In November 1918 the first Cabinet of Lithuania was formed, and the Council of Lithuania gained control over the territory of Lithuania. Independent Lithuania, although it would soon be battling the Wars of Independence, became a reality.

While the Act's original document has been lost, its legacy continues. The laconic Act is the legal basis for the existence of modern Lithuania, both during the interwar period and since 1990. The Act formulated the basic constitutional principles that were and still are followed by all Constitutions of Lithuania. The Act itself was a key element in the foundation of Lithuania's re-establishment of independence in 1990. Lithuania, breaking away from the Soviet Union, stressed that it was simply re-establishing the independent state that existed between the world wars and that the Act never lost its legal power.

(Wikipedia)

English Translation

RESOLUTION

The Council of Lithuania in its session of February 16, 1918 decided unanimously to address the governments of Russia, Germany, and other states with the following declaration:

The Council of Lithuania, as the sole representative of the Lithuanian nation, based on the recognized right to national self-determination, and on the Vilnius Conference's resolution of September 18–23, 1917, proclaims the restoration of the independent state of Lithuania, founded on democratic principles, with Vilnius as its capital, and declares the termination of all state ties which formerly bound this State to other nations. The Council of Lithuania also declares that the foundation of the Lithuanian State and its relations with other countries will be finally determined by the Constituent Assembly, to be convoked as soon as possible, elected democratically by all its inhabitants. The Council of Lithuania by informing the Government of ..................... to this effect requests the recognition of the Independent State of Lithuania.

Category : Featured / Historical Lithuania

The face of cruelty

- Posted by - 6598(3) CommentThe+face+of+cruelty2011-06-11+13%3A30%3A490df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D6598

Antanas Sniečkus, leader of Lithuania’s Communist Party for the period 1940-1974 sent tens of thousands of his own countrymen to inhuman suffering and death in Siberian labour camps.

Antanas Sniečkus, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania (from 15 August 1940 until his death in 1974), is said to have been the initiator of the first mass deportations of Lithuanians in June 1941. He even had his own brother, with his family, deported to Siberia, where his brother died.

Antanas Sniečkus was born in 1903, in the village of Būbleliai, 60 km west of Kaunas. During the First World War, his family fled to Russia where he observed the Russian revolution of 1917. In 1919, his family returned to Lithuania; by 1920 he was already a member of the Bolshevik Party. In the same year, he was arrested for anti-governmental activities. He was released from prison on bail, but fled to Moscow, and became an agent of the Comintern. In Moscow, he earned the trust of Zigmas Angarietis, and Vincas Mickevičius-Kapsukas, and became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania. In 1926, the Comintern sent Sniečkus to Lithuania to replace the recently-executed Karolis Požėla as head of the banned and underground Communist Party of Lithuania.

From 1926 to 1930, he engaged in subversive activities in Lithuania, and was again arrested and imprisoned for them in the Kaunas Prison in 1930. In 1933, Sniečkus was released in exchange for Lithuanian political prisoners held in the USSR. In 1936, he returned to Lithuania. In 1939, he was arrested again, and sentenced to eight years in prison.

After the Soviets invaded and occupied Lithuania, Sniečkus was released from prison on 18 June 1940, and became the head of the Department of National Security. Foreign Affairs Commissar Vladimir Dekanozov, arrived in Lithuania a few days earlier on June 15, 1940, to organize the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. As party secretary, Sniečkus issued Vladimir Dekanozov’s orders in the party’s name.

Sniečkus helped create an atmosphere of terror prior to the elections of the newly established, by the Soviet authorities, People's Seimas in July 1940. Only the Communist Party of Lithuania and its collaborators could nominate candidates. People were threatened in various ways to participate in the elections, but the results were falsified anyway. 21 July 1940 the People's Parliament, declared that the Lithuanian "people" wanted to join the Soviet Union, and 3 August 3 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR incorporated Lithuania into the Soviet Union.

The process of annexation was formally over and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was created. From 15 August 1940, until his death in 1974, Sniečkus remained the First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

34 years of terror and atrocities against his own people had finally come to an end.

Category : Historical Lithuania

The significance of 14 June 1941

- Posted by - 6575(2) CommentThe+significance+of+14+June+19412011-06-11+13%3A29%3A210df53x21http%3A%2F%2Fvilnews.com%2F%3Fp%3D6575

Every year, around 14th June, Baltic communities all over the world commemorate the mass-deportations from their homelands by USSR occupying forces, to the Siberian gulags during and after WWII.

In June 1940 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were occupied by Soviet Russia. One year later, on the fatal night of 14 June 1941, at least 60,000 people from those three countries were deported at a single stroke to the remote Siberian regions of the former USSR. Some 27.000 Lithuanians were arrested and deported during the week of 14 and 20 June 1941, before the Soviet-German war broke out 22 June 1941.

The deportations of 14 June 1941 were acts of macabre political violence never before experienced by the Baltic people. The vivid memory of that day has remained indelible in the minds of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians.

The fate of the Baltic States was decided by the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 between Nazi Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (see below article). A secret protocol to this treaty assigned Finland, Estonia, Latvia and eastern Poland to the Soviet orbit.

In June 1940 a Soviet ultimatum demanded new Baltic governments "able and willing to secure the honest application of the Soviet-Baltic mutual assistance treaty". The following days Soviet forces occupied the whole region.

People of all social strata and nationality were deported, and it is hard to speculate about the general principle underlying these deportations. The victims were generally those regarded as 'socially harmful or undesirable.' For several months preceding the deportations, the NKVD (later renamed to KGB) employees were engaged in composing the lists of people to be deported. Later, it became clear that these lists were composed haphazardly and were based on apparently unconfirmed denunciations.

The deportation process often started with an NKVD truck approaching the house where the target family lived. Two of the three NKVD men in the truck entered the house and told the victims to pack up. Some people got twenty minutes to pack, others, an entire day. The manner was rude, the soldiers did not give any consideration to age or illness. There were cases when persons to be deported were carried into the truck on a stretcher. Then the load of deportees was taken to cattle wagons which were already waiting for them on a side track of the railway station.

The Soviet culture of violence exploded when Nazi troops crossed into Lithuania 22 June 1941. As Soviet authorities fled, some local communist officials summarily executed prisoners whom they could not take along. In turn Lithuanians rose in revolt and attacked the retreating Red Army.

Urged on by Nazi propaganda that identified Jews with communism, some joined the Nazi authorities and turned on the Jewish population of the republic. During WWII, an estimated 90-95 percent of Lithuania’s some 250.000 Jews were killed.

When the Red Army returned to Lithuania in 1944, it found a different mood and even a different population than it had faced in 1940. In the cities, the historic Jewish communities barely existed; many urban Lithuanians had fled to seek refuge in the West as “Displaced Persons.”

In the countryside, partisan groups offered fierce armed resistance to Soviet rule, through a guerilla war referred to as the longest and bloodiest in modern European history, killing more than 20.000 Lithuanians and 70.000 Soviet soldiers during the period 1944-1953.

Category : Historical Lithuania

OPINIONS

Have your say. Send to:
editor@VilNews.com

By Dr. Boris Vytautas Bakunas,
Ph. D., Chicago

A wave of unity sweeps the international Lithuanian community on March 11th every year as Lithuanians celebrated the anniversary of the Lithuanian Parliament's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. However, the sense of national unity engendered by the celebration could be short-lived.

Human beings have a strong tendency to overgeneralize and succumb to stereotypical us-them distinctions that can shatter even the strongest bonds. We need only search the internet to find examples of divisive thinking at work:

- "50 years of Soviet rule has ruined an entire generation of Lithuanian.

- "Those who fled Lithuania during World II were cowards -- and now they come back, flaunt their wealth, and tell us 'true Lithuanians' how to live."

- "Lithuanians who work abroad have abandoned their homeland and should be deprived of their Lithuanian citizenship."

Could such stereotypical, emotionally-charged accusations be one of the main reasons why relations between Lithuania's diaspora groups and their countrymen back home have become strained?

* * *

Text: Saulene Valskyte

In Lithuania Christmas Eve is a family event and the New Year's Eve a great party with friends!
Lithuanian say "Kaip sutiksi naujus metus, taip juos ir praleisi" (the way you'll meet the new year is the way you will spend it). So everyone is trying to spend New Year's Eve with friend and have as much fun as possible.

Lithuanian New Year's traditions are very similar to those in other countries, and actually were similar since many years ago. Also, the traditional Lithuanian New Years Eve party was very similar to other big celebrations throughout the year.

The New Year's Eve table is quite similar to the Christmas Eve table, but without straws under the tablecloth, and now including meat dishes. A tradition that definitely hasn't changes is that everybody is trying not to fell asleep before midnight. It was said that if you oversleep the midnight point you will be lazy all the upcoming year. People were also trying to get up early on the first day of the new year, because waking up late also meant a very lazy and unfortunate year.

During the New Year celebration people were dancing, singing, playing games and doing magic to guess the future. People didn't drink much of alcohol, especially was that the case for women.

Here are some advices from elders:
- During the New Year, be very nice and listen to relatives - what you are during New Year Eve, you will be throughout the year.

- During to the New Year Eve, try not to fall, because if this happens, next year you will be unhappy.

- If in the start of the New Year, the first news are good - then the year will be successful. If not - the year will be problematic.

New year predictions

* If during New Year eve it's snowing - then it will be bad weather all year round. If the day is fine - one can expect good harvest.
* If New Year's night is cold and starry - look forward to a good summer!
* If the during New Year Eve trees are covered with frost - then it will be a good year. If it is wet weather on New Year's Eve, one can expect a year where many will die and dangerous epidemics occur.
* If the first day of the new year is snowy - the upcoming year will see many young people die. If the night is snowy - mostly old people will die.
* If the New Year time is cold - then Easter will be warm.
* If during New Year there are a lot of birds in your homestead - then all year around there will be many guests and the year will be fun.

* * *

VilNews
Christmas greetings
from Vilnius

* * *

Ukraine won the historic
and epic battle for the
future

By Leonidas Donskis

Kaunas
Philosopher, political theorist, historian of
ideas, social analyst, and political
commentator

Immediately after Russia stepped in Syria, we understood that it is time to sum up the convoluted and long story about Ukraine and the EU - a story of pride and prejudice which has a chance to become a story of a new vision regained after self-inflicted blindness.

Ukraine was and continues to be perceived by the EU political class as a sort of grey zone with its immense potential and possibilities for the future, yet deeply embedded and trapped in No Man's Land with all of its troubled past, post-Soviet traumas, ambiguities, insecurities, corruption, social divisions, and despair. Why worry for what has yet to emerge as a new actor of world history in terms of nation-building, European identity, and deeper commitments to transparency and free market economy?

Right? Wrong. No matter how troubled Ukraine's economic and political reality could be, the country has already passed the point of no return. Even if Vladimir Putin retains his leverage of power to blackmail Ukraine and the West in terms of Ukraine's zero chances to accede to NATO due to the problems of territorial integrity, occupation and annexation of Crimea, and mayhem or a frozen conflict in the Donbas region, Ukraine will never return to Russia's zone of influence. It could be deprived of the chances to join NATO or the EU in the coming years or decades, yet there are no forces on earth to make present Ukraine part of the Eurasia project fostered by Putin.

* * *

Watch this video if you
want to learn about the
new, scary propaganda
war between Russia,
The West and the
Baltic States!

* * *

90% of all Lithuanians
believe their government
is corrupt

Lithuania is perceived to be the country with the most widespread government corruption, according to an international survey involving almost 40 countries.

* * *

Lithuanian medical
students say no to
bribes for doctors

On International Anticorruption Day, the Special Investigation Service shifted their attention to medical institutions, where citizens encounter bribery most often. Doctors blame citizens for giving bribes while patients complain that, without bribes, they won't receive proper medical attention. Campaigners against corruption say that bribery would disappear if medical institutions themselves were to take resolute actions against corruption and made an effort to take care of their patients.

* * *

Doing business in Lithuania

By Grant Arthur Gochin

California - USA

Lithuania emerged from the yoke of the Soviet Union a mere 25 years ago. Since then, Lithuania has attempted to model upon other European nations, joining NATO, Schengen, and the EU. But, has the Soviet Union left Lithuania?

During Soviet times, government was administered for the people in control, not for the local population, court decisions were decreed, they were not the administration of justice, and academia was the domain of ideologues. 25 years of freedom and openness should have put those bad experiences behind Lithuania, but that is not so.

Today, it is a matter of expectation that court pronouncements will be governed by ideological dictates. Few, if any Lithuanians expect real justice to be effected. For foreign companies, doing business in Lithuania is almost impossible in a situation where business people do not expect rule of law, so, surely Government would be a refuge of competence?

Lithuanian Government has not emerged from Soviet styles. In an attempt to devolve power, Lithuania has created a myriad of fiefdoms of power, each speaking in the name of the Government, each its own centralized power base of ideology.

* * *

Greetings from Wales!

By Anita Šovaitė-Woronycz
Chepstow, Wales

Think of a nation in northern Europe whose population is around the 3 million mark a land of song, of rivers, lakes, forests, rolling green hills, beautiful coastline a land where mushrooms grow ready for the picking, a land with a passion for preserving its ancient language and culture.

Doesn't that sound suspiciously like Lithuania? Ah, but I didn't mention the mountains of Snowdonia, which would give the game away.

I'm talking about Wales, that part of the UK which Lithuanians used to call "Valija", but later named "Velsas" (why?). Wales, the nation which has welcomed two Lithuanian heads of state to its shores - firstly Professor Vytautas Landsbergis, who has paid several visits and, more recently, President Dalia Grybauskaitė who attended the 2014 NATO summit which was held in Newport, South Wales.

MADE IN WALES -
ENGLISH VERSION OF THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
VYTAUTAS LANDSBERGIS.

* * *

IS IT POSSIBLE TO
COMMENT ON OUR
ARTICLES? :-)

Read Cassandra's article HERE

Read Rugile's article HERE

Did you know there is a comment field right after every article we publish? If you read the two above posts, you will see that they both have received many comments. Also YOU are welcome with your comments. To all our articles!

* * *

Greetings from Toronto

By Antanas Sileika,
Toronto, Canada

Toronto was a major postwar settlement centre for Lithuanian Displaced Persons, and to this day there are two Catholic parishes and one Lutheran one, as well as a Lithuanian House, retirement home, and nursing home. A new wave of immigrants has showed interest in sports.

Although Lithuanian activities have thinned over the decades as that postwar generation died out, the Lithuanian Martyrs' parish hall is crowded with many, many hundreds of visitors who come to the Lithuanian cemetery for All Souls' Day. Similarly, the Franciscan parish has standing room only for Christmas Eve mass.

Although I am firmly embedded in the literary culture of Canada, my themes are usually Lithuanian, and I'll be in Kaunas and Vilnius in mid-November 2015 to give talks about the Lithuanian translations of my novels and short stories, which I write in English.

If you have the Lithuanian language, come by to one of the talks listed in the links below. And if you don't, you can read more about my work at
www.anatanassileika.com

http://www.vdu.lt/lt/rasytojas-antanas-sileika-pristatys-savo-kuryba/
https://leu.lt/lt/lf/lf_naujienos/kvieciame-i-rasytojo-59hc.html

* * *

As long as VilNews exists,
there is hope for the future

Professor Irena Veisaite, Chairwoman of our Honorary Council, asked us to convey her heartfelt greetings to the other Council Members and to all readers of VilNews.

"My love and best wishes to all. As long as VilNews exists, there is hope for the future,"" she writes.

Irena Veisaite means very much for our publication, and we do hereby thank her for the support and wise commitment she always shows.

You can read our interview with her

HERE.

* * *

EU-Russia:
Facing a new reality

By Vygaudas Ušackas

EU Ambassador to the Russian Federation

Dear readers of VilNews,

It's great to see this online resource for people interested in Baltic affairs. I congratulate the editors. From my position as EU Ambassador to Russia, allow me to share some observations.

For a number of years, the EU and Russia had assumed the existence of a strategic partnership, based on the convergence of values, economic integration and increasingly open markets and a modernisation agenda for society.

Our agenda was positive and ambitious. We looked at Russia as a country ready to converge with "European values", a country likely to embrace both the basic principles of democratic government and a liberal concept of the world order. It was believed this would bring our relations to a new level, covering the whole spectrum of the EU's strategic relationship with Russia.

* * *

The likelihood of Putin
invading Lithuania

By Mikhail Iossel

Professor of English at Concordia University, Canada
Founding Director at Summer Literary Seminars

The likelihood of Putin's invading Lithuania or fomenting a Donbass-style counterfeit pro-Russian uprising there, at this point, in my strong opinion, is no higher than that of his attacking Portugal, say, or Ecuador. Regardless of whether he might or might not, in principle, be interested in the insane idea of expanding Russia's geographic boundaries to those of the former USSR (and I for one do not believe that has ever been his goal), he knows this would be entirely unfeasible, both in near- and long-term historical perspective, for a variety of reasons. It is not going to happen. There will be no restoration of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical entity.

* * *

Are all Lithuanian energy
problems now resolved?

By Dr. Stasys Backaitis,

P.E., CSMP, SAE Fellow Member of Central and Eastern European Coalition, Washington, D.C., USA

Lithuania's Energy Timeline - from total dependence to independence

Lithuania as a country does not have significant energy resources. Energy consuming infrastructure after WWII was small and totally supported by energy imports from Russia.

First nuclear reactor begins power generation at Ignalina in 1983, the second reactor in 1987. Iganlina generates enough electricity to cover Lithuania's needs and about 50%.for export. As, prerequisite for membership in EU, Ignalina ceases all nuclear power generation in 2009

The Klaipėda Sea terminal begins Russia's oil export operations in 1959 and imports in 1994.

Mazeikiu Nafta (current ORLEAN Lietuva) begins operation of oil refinery in 1980.

* * *

Have Lithuanian ties across
the Baltic Sea become
stronger in recent years?

By Eitvydas Bajarunas

Ambassador to Sweden

My answer to affirmative "yes". Yes, Lithuanian ties across the Baltic Sea become as never before solid in recent years. For me the biggest achievement of Lithuania in the Baltic Sea region during recent years is boosting Baltic and Nordic ties. And not because of mere accident - Nordic direction was Lithuania's strategic choice.

The two decades that have passed since regaining Lithuania's independence can be described as a "building boom". From the wreckage of a captive Soviet republic, a generation of Lithuanians have built a modern European state, and are now helping construct a Nordic-Baltic community replete with institutions intended to promote political coordination and foster a trans-Baltic regional identity. Indeed, a "Nordic-Baltic community" - I will explain later in my text the meaning of this catch-phrase.

Since the restoration of Lithuania's independence 25 years ago, we have continuously felt a strong support from Nordic countries. Nordics in particular were among the countries supporting Lithuania's and Baltic States' striving towards independence. Take example of Iceland, country which recognized Lithuania in February of 1991, well in advance of other countries. Yet another example - Swedish Ambassador was the first ambassador accredited to Lithuania in 1991. The other countries followed suit. When we restored our statehood, Nordic Countries became champions in promoting Baltic integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. To large degree thanks Nordic Countries, massive transformations occurred in Lithuania since then, Lithuania became fully-fledged member of the EU and NATO, and we joined the Eurozone on 1 January 2015.

* * *

It's the economy, stupid *

By Valdas (Val) Samonis,

PhD, CPC

n his article, Val Samonis takes a comparative policy look at the Lithuanian economy during the period 2000-2015. He argues that the LT policy response (a radical and classical austerity) was wrong and unenlightened because it coincided with strong and continuing deflationary forces in the EU and the global economy which forces were predictable, given the right policy guidance. Also, he makes a point that LT austerity, and the resulting sharp drop in GDP and employment in LT, stimulated emigration of young people (and the related worsening of other demographics) which processes took huge dimensions thereby undercutting even the future enlightened efforts to get out of the middle-income growth trap by LT. Consequently, the country is now on the trajectory (development path) similar to that of a dog that chases its own tail. A strong effort by new generation of policymakers is badly needed to jolt the country out of that wrong trajectory and to offer the chance of escaping the middle-income growth trap via innovations.

* * *

Have you heard about the
South African "Pencil Test"?

By Karina Simonson

If you are not South African, then, probably, you haven't. It is a test performed in South Africa during the apartheid regime and was used, together with the other ways, to determine racial identity, distinguishing whites from coloureds and blacks. That repressive test was very close to Nazi implemented ways to separate Jews from Aryans. Could you now imagine a Lithuanian mother, performing it on her own child?

But that is exactly what happened to me when I came back from South Africa. I will tell you how.

* * * Click HERE to read previous opinion letters >


Typical Karaim house in Trakai, 30 km from Vilnius city.	A senior Tatar Muslim cleric (akhund)