By Mikhail Iossel

Professor of English at Concordia University, Canada

Founding Director at Summer Literary Seminars

The likelihood of Putin’s invading Lithuania or fomenting a Donbass-style counterfeit pro-Russian uprising there, at this point, in my strong opinion, is no higher than that of his attacking Portugal, say, or Ecuador. Regardless of whether he might or might not, in principle, be interested in the insane idea of expanding Russia’s geographic boundaries to those of the former USSR (and I for one do not believe that has ever been his goal), he knows this would be entirely unfeasible, both in near- and long-term historical perspective, for a variety of reasons. It is not going to happen. There will be no restoration of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical entity.

In tacit recognition of that immutable fact, the word combination “the Russian world,” which Putin had brought into political existence ever so triumphantly back in the Spring of 2014, in the immediate wake of the Crimea annexation, has been taken out of circulation completely quite months ago, along with any mentions of the mythological “Novorossiya” (the eight large administrative areas of South-Central and South-Eastern Ukraine which — again, according to the glowing, fever-minded post-Crimean Putin — supposedly, as per some unverifiable historical sources, used to belong to pre-historic, pre-Russian Russia thousands of years ago).

Putin finds himself at this point in a terrible bind of his own making. The simple truth of the matter is this: Russia’s economy is in a shambles, and in a free-fall. Its decline started at least three years ago, prior to Putin’s escapades on the international arena, and subsequently was further exacerbated to a great degree by the drastic slump in oil prices and, of course, the imposition of the Western sanctions against Russia (and, in a remarkable development of breathtaking inanity, along the lines of cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face, Russia’s reflexive imposition of “food” sanctions against… itself). Simply put, Putin just cannot afford any more large-scale military ventures abroad, if only on purely fiscal grounds. Additionally, he knows now he wouldn’t be able to get away with anything minimally extracurricular there anymore. Having failed to blackmail the West into submissive torpor by indicating his supposed willingness to use Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons in Europe — in effect, attempting to call the West’s bluff thusly: “In Russia, we don’t value our own lives as much as you do, the enfeebled westerns. Well, America and Germany and all the rest of you westerners, are you sure you’d be willing to sacrifice the lives of your young men and women in uniform for the sake of Daugavpils, say, or Narva or Klaipeda?” — he knows full-well now, even based on the immediate subsequent deployment of the US tactical and airforce detachments in the former Soviet Baltic republics, that yes, indeed, NATO most certainly will abide unwaveringly by its charter on common defence, chapter and verse, and will perceive an attack on any one of its members as an aggression against every one of them at once. Putin’s attempt at intimidating the West, thus, ended up in the form of an egg on his own face. And he knows now, too, and only too well, that the West will not hesitate to impose the further, considerably more stringent still, sanctions against his regime, in the case of any slightest display of aggressiveness on his part in Ukraine, let alone anyplace else in Europe. Russia’s economy will not be able to withstand any amount of further punishment, no matter how minute. Such previously discussed steps as, for instance,  banning Russian financial institutions from using the SWIFT interbank payment system, would quite literally bring down to its knees the country’s entire financial system.

It is, then, for a combination of above-state reasons that Putin has been hamstrung in South-Eastern Ukraine, forced to freeze the active phase of the conflict here, initiate the removal of Russian troops from the former battle zone, “disown” (or in their view, betray) the local pro-Russian separatists he himself had created and trained and armed to the teeth; and hence, his, ever more insistent efforts to force Ukraine into “taking back” that, thoroughly and pointlessly devastated, war-ravaged region of defunct coal mines and pauperized, angry and confused populace.

It is important to understand that Putin has suffered a devastating, humiliating defeat in Ukraine. None of his overarching original goals for tat endeavour have been achieved. There will be no mythical “Novorossiya,” and therefore no land corridor to the annexed Crimea, which is cut off from Russia geographically and, representing a sort of metaphorical piece of luggage without a handle, already is suffering dramatic price increases and conspicuous rise in the levels of corruption. There will be no wholesale destruction of Ukraine as a form of punishment for her having rejected the corrupt, criminal, authoritarian, dead-end ways of Putin’s fascist regime in Russia. Ukraine is drifting away from Russia, moving decisively in the European direction; and despite the massive current difficulties of economic and structural nature, it will be fine in the end, it will be all right, it will survive, because the western world is on her side, and it will help to pull her through the current hardship. Russia, on the other hand, is getting progressively weaker, having enmeshed itself in a hopeless new “cold war” with the West. Putin’s vanity, his burning desire to be perceived as an equal to the western leaders (and first and foremost among them, the US President) and, impossibly enough, to have the clock of history turned back to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements era, with the world divided between the US and Russian spheres of influence — they have gotten the best of him. There is not a single conceivable scenario whereby Russia could come out the winner in this present confrontation with the West, whose economy collectively is 15 or 20 times stronger than that of Russia, and whose combined military power is vastly superior to Russia’s, as well.

What is Putin to do? His overriding goal in life, at this point, it appears, is to end up dying in his own bed. And since Putin has been proclaimed by his propagandists synonymous with Russia, in terms of his physical and spiritual existence, the above goal has also become Russia’s ultimate strategic goal, for now. He has lost in Ukraine, but he cannot admit that fact publicly. The one hundred million-strong army of Russian TV-viewers, having been subject over the past year to the most extraordinarily intense and toxic media propaganda campaign in human history, continues to be in a highly chauvinistic, belligerent, beclouded state of mind. It wants to keep being assured that Russia is kicking the West’s butt everywhere in the world. Putin, thus, needs to have his populace’s attention switched away from the failure of his Ukrainian campaign, as well as from the catastrophic state of the country’s economy (food prices rising exponentially from week to week, inflation going through the roof, people’s incomes shrinking faster that the portrait of Dorian Grey at its fastest, and millions of people falling into extreme poverty over the last year alone). Enter Syria — Russia’s last ally in the Middle East. Enter the show of Russia’s reclaiming its lost status of a global superpower: “We’re back in the Middle East! The West can no longer keep ignoring us! We’re a superpower again!” It is a virtual war, largely, one made for TV: with no Russian boots on the ground and the Russian planes bombing away at will at random targets, with no perceptible results. Now it’s Syria around the clock on Russian TV-screens — and barely a peep about Ukraine.

It is not difficult to predict the way this latest, Syrian campaign is going to turn out for Putin. Virtual wars have progressively shorter shelf lives in modern world. And then what? Then there will be something else — but already inside Russia, where the new, weaker edition of Stalin-era terror is already being introduced. Putin is desperate. What we are witnessing now is his political agony.

By Dr. Stasys Backaitis,

P.E., CSMP, SAE Fellow Member of Central and Eastern European Coalition, Washington, D.C., USA

Lithuania’s Energy Timeline – from total dependence to independence

Lithuania as a country does not have significant energy resources. Energy consuming infrastructure after WWII was small and totally supported by energy imports from Russia.

First nuclear reactor begins power generation at Ignalina in 1983, the second reactor in 1987. Ignalina generates enough electricity to cover Lithuania’s needs and about 50%.for export..As, prerequisite for membership in EU, Ignalina ceases all nuclear power generation in 2009.

The Klaipėda Sea terminal begins Russia’s oil export operations in 1959 and imports in 1994.

Mazeikiu Nafta (current ORLEAN Lietuva) begins operation of oil refinery in 1980.

Russia supplies oil to the refinery via Druzhba pipeline since 1980. Stops delivery in 2006.

Lithuania builds remote terminal in the Baltic sea in 1999 at Butinge to export/import oil.

Upon joining EU in 2004, Lithuania is seeking independence from Russia energy sources. Up  to 2014, Lithuania imports all gas and most oil and electricity needs from Russia.

In 2014, Lithuania completes construction of LNG terminal at Klaipeda and begins LNG import

In  2018/9, Lithuania and Poland plan to complete pipeline connection for LNG transmission.

By end of 2015, a 700 MW electric powerline (Nord Balt) will connect Lithuania with Sweeden.

In late 2016, a 1000 MW electric powerline (LITPOL-Link) will connect Lithuania with Poland.

LNG and electricity interconnections with EU assures energy independence from Russia.

LNG and electricity imports allow energy sharing with Latvia and Estonia.

Some typical relevant picture montage:

Ignalina – closed nuclear power plant in 2009

Oil transfer station in the Baltic sea at Butinge           Oil transfer receptacle

Oil Storage station at Butinge

Oil Refinery – Mazeikiu Nafta (Orlean Lietuva)

Klaipeda – ship to shore oil transfer terminal

Oil transport from Klaipeda Nafta to Belarus

Current gas pipeline network in Lithuania

LNG island terminal (yellow circle) just east of inlet to port of Klaipeda

LNG carrying tanker entering the port of Klaipeda inlet

LNG is transferred from tanker to a stationary floating terminal

Preparing a 500 mln cu.m. underground LNG strage facilty at Syderiai

Locations of Lithuania’s electricity producers and the distribution grid

High voltage transmission line towers

Elektrenai, Lithuania’s main electrical power plant, Four gas and/or oil powered blocks 300 MW/ea., one 455 MW combined cycle block

Vilnius Energy – combined heat (603 MW) and electric (360MW) power plant

Kaunas hydroelectric 110MW power plant

Kruonis Pumped Storage Hydroelectric 900MW powerplant

Lithuania’s current wind power generation in 17 parks -  282 MW

Solar Energy Generating Systems delivered in 2013 61 MW of electric power

Heat and electricity generation with biofuels and biomass produced nearly 23% of Lithuania’s consumed energy. It is still rapidly expanding

Electrical „LitPol Link” in rapid construction in Lithuania and Poland

By Eitvydas Bajarūnas

Lithuanian Ambassador to Sweden

My answer to affirmative “yes”. Yes, Lithuanian ties across the Baltic Sea become as never before solid in recent years. For me the biggest achievement of Lithuania in the Baltic Sea region during recent years is boosting Baltic and Nordic ties. And not because of mere accident – Nordic direction was Lithuania’s strategic choice.

The two decades that have passed since regaining Lithuania‘s independence can be described as a “building boom”. From the wreckage of a captive Soviet republic, a generation of Lithuanians have built a modern European state, and are now helping construct a Nordic-Baltic community replete with institutions intended to promote political coordination and foster a trans-Baltic regional identity. Indeed, a “Nordic-Baltic community” – I will explain later in my text the meaning of this catch-phrase.

Since the restoration of Lithuania’s independence 25 years ago, we have continuously felt a strong support from Nordic countries. Nordics in particular were among the countries supporting Lithuania’s and Baltic States’ striving towards independence. Take example of Iceland, country which recognized Lithuania in February of 1991, well in advance of other countries. Yet another example – Swedish Ambassador was the first ambassador accredited to Lithuania in 1991. The other countries followed suit. When we restored our statehood, Nordic Countries became champions in promoting Baltic integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. To large degree thanks Nordic Countries, massive transformations occurred in Lithuania since then, Lithuania became fully-fledged member of the EU and NATO, and we joined the Eurozone on 1 January 2015.

Lithuania took advantage of it very successfully because we soon realized that the assistance and support of the Nordic Countries could help us to play more a significant role in the European and transatlantic space as well as help us solve problems that were urgent for us and the entire region. Nordics, especially – Sweden, became the largest investors in Lithuania, not to mention their financial support for our states’ civil societies, democracy and other important processes which were particularly important to us as developing states that had restored their independence and statehood. And this is quite natural: Nordic and Baltic are united by common values, interests and clear goals. We cherish our freedom but we also care a great deal about everyone’s right to be free.

Several public opinion polls pointed out that Lithuanians believe Lithuania should be associated with the region of Northern Europe, and not with Eastern Europe. Northern orientation dominated in the cases of Estonia and Latvia as well. Orientation towards the North was even proposed by a foreign company that consulted the Government of Lithuania some years ago on image creation issues: in terms of economy Lithuania had rather be associated with the stable, advanced, socially responsible Nordic Countries than the post-soviet space.

Read more…

VilNews is back!

Our publication VilNews has been inactive over the past two years. But here we are again, ready with a fresh new issue. We wish old and new readers worldwide warmly welcome!

VilNews is no normal media, more a communication platform where our readers are invited to give feedback and also write comment articles. I hope you all will enjoy reading/seeing the material we will be publishing!

“New” VilNews consists of 18 sections that you can immerse yourself into by clicking on the link buttons at the top of each page.

If “old” VilNews had been printed on paper, it would become a book of more than 7,000 pages of totally unique reading material about historical and contemporary Lithuania. This huge material is still available. All old and new articles are sorted by topics, in our 18 sections.

I wish you some good reading, and please do not hesitate to contact us!

Aage Myhre
Editor-in-Chief
aage.myhre@VilNews.com

Writer Yves Plasseraud: My book about Irena Veisaite

Her intelligence and
strength struck me

image001

I have known Irena some 25 years ago within the frame of her Soros Foundation activities, but it was only a few years ago that I began thinking about writing her biography. At the beginning, with Irena our conversations were more or less technical, about Human Rights, minorities, Jewish issues and Lithuanian Jewish relations, in which we were both involved.

The intelligence and the strength of her convictions rapidly struck me.